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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional law tends, to define itself through reaction to great
cases. The defining case for the last several decades was Brown v. Board
of Education '-an example of social reorganization, in the interest of a
racial minority, brought about through the judiciary. Roe v. Wade2 has
to some extent played this role for the past decade, and its status as a
defining case may grow larger in the next generation. But for more
than a half-century, the most important of all defining cases has been
Lochner v. New York. 3 The spectre of Lochner has loomed over most im-
portant constitutional decisions, whether they uphold or invalidate gov-
ernmental practices.4 In the different answers to the question, what
was wrong with the decision in Lochner?, can be found the various posi-
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. This is a revised version of the Samuel
Rubin lecture, delivered while the author was Samuel Rubin Visiting Professor of Law at
Columbia Law School in the fall of 1986. The author would like to thank Bruce A.
Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Richard Briffault, Stephen Ellman, Richard Epstein, Richard
Fallon, Terry Fisher, George Fletcher, Philip Frickey, Wendy Gordon, Kent Greenawalt,
Stephen Holmes, Pamela Karlen, Andrew Kaufman, Larry Kramer, Anthony T.
Kronman, Daniel Meltzer, Frank Michelman, Geoffrey Miller, Martha Minow, Henry P.
Monaghan, Richard A. Posner, Steven Shiffrin, Richard B. Stewart, Geoffrey R. Stone,
David Strauss, Peter L. Strauss, Laurence H. Tribe, Mark V. Tushnet, and Roberto Un-
ger for helpful comments. Participants in the legal theory workshops at the Harvard,
New York University, University of Minnesota, and University of Pennsylvania law
schools also gave valuable help. Daniel B. Rodriguez provided research assistance and
useful comments.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
4. The most recent example is Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986), where
the Court rejected a claim that a state prohibition of sodomy among consenting adults
violated the due process clause. According to the Court:
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or design of the Constitution. That this is so was painfully demon-
strated by the face-off between the Executive and the Court in the 1930's,
which resulted in the repudiation of much of the substantive gloss that the
Court placed on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive
reach of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of
rights deemed to be fundamental.
Id. at 2846. It is this view of the lesson of the Lochner period that is questioned here.
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tions on most of the major constitutional issues of the modem era.5
The received wisdom is that Lochner was wrong because it involved
'judicial activism": an illegitimate intrusion by the courts into a realm
properly reserved to the political branches of government. This view
has spawned an enormous literature6 and takes various forms. 7 The
basic understanding has been endorsed by the Court in many cases tak-
ing the lesson of the Lochner period to be the need for judicial deference
to legislative enactments.8
The principal purpose of this essay, descriptive in character, is to
understand Lochner from a different point of view. For the Lochner
Court, neutrality, understood in a particular way, was a constitutional
requirement. The key concepts here are threefold: government inac-
tion, the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements, and the
baseline set by the common law. Governmental intervention was con-
stitutionally troublesome, whereas inaction was not; and both neutrality
and inaction were defined as respect for the behavior of private actors
pursuant to the common law, in light of the existing distribution of
wealth and entitlements. Whether there was a departure from the re-
quirement of neutrality, in short, depended on whether the govern-
ment had altered the common law distribution of entitlements. Market
ordering under the common law was understood to be a part of nature
rather than a legal construct, and it formed the baseline from which to
measure the constitutionally critical lines that distinguished action from
inaction and neutrality from impermissible partisanship. This under-
standing of the Lochner period is faithful to what the Court said when it
both engaged in and abandoned Lochner-like reasoning, and it points to
an important element in the Lochner Court's approach, one that has lit-
tle to do with an aggressive judicial role in general. 9
5. The view that Lochner was wrong is not, however, unanimously held. See R.
Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Law of Eminent Domain 5 (1985).
6. See, e.g., J. Choper, The Supreme Court and the National Political Process
(1980);J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980); M. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts,
and Human Rights (1982).
7. Sometimes the view is based on the text of the Constitution and the "intent" of
its framers, see, e.g., Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353
(1981); sometimes it is based on conceptions of democracy, see, e.g., Bork, Neutral Prin-
ciples and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1 (1971); sometimes it grows
out of"process-perfecting" theories, see, e.g.,J. Ely, supra note 6, at 73, 228-29 n.91;
sometimes it depends on distinctions between matters of policy, to be resolved by the
legislature, and matters of principle, to be resolved by the courts, see R. Dworkin, Tak-
ing Rights Seriously (1979).
8. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
9. Whether this understanding of Lochner should be accepted in place of one that
stresses an active judicial role is an inescapably normative question, taken up infra notes
144-67 and accompanying text. The principal effort here is to set forth an alternative
approach that fits the history at least as well and that has dramatically different implica-
tions. See infra notes 168-205 and accompanying text. Moreover, this understanding
[Vol. 87:873
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Understood in this way, however, Lochner has many descendants in
current law. Numerous decisions depend in whole or in part on com-
mon law baselines or understandings of inaction and neutrality that
owe their origin to Lochner-like understandings. And if Lochner is under-
stood in these terms, its heirs are not Roe v. Wade10 and Miranda v.
Arizona," but instead such decisions as Washington v. Davis,12 Buckley v.
Valeo,13 Regents of California v. Bakke, 14 and various cases immunizing
those who are thought not to be "state actors" from constitutional con-
straints. These and other decisions can be understood from a unitary
perspective through the lens of the Lochner period. Such a perspective
may or may not justify dramatic departures from current law. It may be
that modem doctrine, insofar as it shares Lochner's premises, is entirely
unobjectionable.
The second purpose of the essay is normative. To some degree,
Lochner-like themes are so deeply ingrained in the constitutional order,
indeed in the very concept of constitutionalism, 15 that it would be
hopeless to attempt to abandon them even if it were desirable to do so.
But in some settings, the modem progeny of Lochner, like Lochner itself,
depend on false premises and lead to unfortunate results. Most impor-
tant, the baselines selected by the Court and the use of the key con-
cepts -"neutrality" and "inaction"- are often a mistake, for the same
reasons that originally led to the rejection of Lochner and the common
law system of regulation generally. The eventual task is to design a set
of constitutional doctrines that does not derive from common law rules
but that instead builds on still-emerging principles that might be
roughly associated with the New Deal. The final section of this Article
ventures some thoughts on how to accomplish that task.
Almost eighty years since the case was decided, the lesson of the
Lochner period has yet to be settled. The purpose of this Article is to
suggest that the case should be taken to symbolize not merely an ag-
gressive judicial role, but an approach that imposes a constitutional re-
quirement of neutrality, and understands the term to refer to
preservation of the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements
under the baseline of the common law. Thus understood, Lochner has
hardly been overruled.
was not invented in the Lochner era. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Granch) 87 (1810)
(using contract clause and "general principles ... common to our free institutions" to
invalidate rescissions of a land grant).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
12. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
13. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
14. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
15. For general discussion, see Constitutionalism and Democracy (J. Elster & R.
Slagstaad eds. forthcoming 1988).
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I. THE RsE AND FALL (?) OF LOCHNER
It will be useful to begin with excerpts from two important deci-
sions associated with the Lochner period. The first excerpt is from
Adkins v. Childrens Hospital,16 a 1923 decision invalidating minimum
wage legislation for women and children. The Court said:
To the extent that the sum fixed [by the minimum wage stat-
ute] exceeds the fair value of the services rendered, it amounts
to a compulsory exaction from the employer for the support of
a partially indigent person, for whose condition there rests
upon him no peculiar responsibility, and therefore, in effect,
arbitrarily shifts to his shoulders a burden which, if it belongs
to anybody, belongs to society as a whole.' 7
The next excerpt is from the case generally thought to spell the
downfall of Lochner. In the 1937 decision of West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, Is
the Court upheld a minimum wage law for women. The Court said:
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal
position with respect to bargaining power and are thus rela-
tively defenceless against the denial of a living wage.., casts a
direct burden for their support upon the community. What
these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called upon to
pay .... The community is not bound to provide what is in
effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers.' 9
The notion of subsidy is of course incoherent without a baseline
from which to make a measurement. Both of these excerpts refer to
subsidies, but by the time of West Coast Hotel, the concept has been
turned on its head. In Adkins, the Court saw minimum wage legislation
as requiring a subsidy to the public from an innocent employer. Such
legislation was thus a kind of "taking" from A to B. According to the
Court, if B is needy, it is not A, but the public at large, who should pay.
In West Coast Hotel, it is the failure of a state to have minimum wage
legislation that amounts to a subsidy--this time, from the public to the
employer.20 The common law system, for the West Coast Hotel Court,
turns out to subsidize "unconscionable employers." In the fifteen-year
period between Adkins and West Coast Hotel, the baseline has been
shifted. What accounts for the shift? In answering that question, it will
be useful to turn to Lochner itself.
16. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
17. Id. at 557-58.
18. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
19. Id. at 399.
20. To say this is not, of course, to suggest that minimum wage legislation was
constitutionally required. Notably, both Adkins and West Coast Hotel involved statutes dis-
criminating on the basis of gender; such statutes tended, in both purpose and effect, to
diminish the employment prospects of women. See Landes, The Effect of State Maxi-
mum-Hours Laws on the Employment of Women in 1920, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 476 (1980);
Nelson, Women's Poverty and Women's Citizenship: Some Political Consequences of
Economic Marginality, 10 Signs 209, 228-29 (1984).
[Vol. 87:873
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Lochner involved a regulation enacted by the state of New York
prohibiting employers from permitting or requiring bakers to work for
more than sixty hours in a week. The Court's analysis came in several
steps. The Court said that the right of contract-in particular, the right
to buy and sell labor-is part of the liberty protected by the due process
clause. But the Court recognized that the "police power" was available
to justify intrusions on liberty of contract; thus, for example, the gov-
ernment could protect health or morals by restricting contractual
agreements. Here, however, the Court concluded that maximum hour
legislation was not permissible as a "labor law," because bakers were of
full legal capacity and "in no sense wards of the State." 21 Only wards
could be protected through labor legislation.
The Court also concluded that the statute could not be defended
as a health law. The problem was that the state could not demonstrate
a close connection between maximum hour regulation and the protec-
tion of health. There was no sufficient showing that a maximum hour
law was necessary to protect health; and if the evidence brought forth
here were thought sufficient, the state's power would be unlimited.
The Court concluded that the statute was "in reality, passed from...
motives" 22 other than protection of health-motives that were illegiti-
mate but that the Court did not specify.
For the contemporary observer, two features of the Court's ap-
proach are especially distinctive. The first is the sharp limitation of the
category of permissible government ends. Efforts to redistribute re-
sources and paternalistic measures were both constitutionally out of
bounds. They did not fall within the "police power"; the employer had
committed no common law wrong, and regulatory power was largely
limited to the redress of harms recognized at common law. This limita-
tion of the category of permissible ends had important implications,
excluding a wide range of measures enacted by majorities. The scope
of the "police power," as understood in the Lochner era, has never been
entirely clear.23 But there can be no doubt that most forms of redistri-
bution and paternalism were ruled out.
The second step in the Court's approach consists of careful scru-
tiny of the relationship between the permissible end invoked by the
state to support the statute and the means chosen by the state to pro-
mote that end. The Court was unsatisfied by the claim that limitations
on working hours contributed to the health of bakers, notwithstanding
the plausible nature of the claim-hence Justice Harlan's powerful dis-
sent.24 It would thus be possible to accept, as did Justice Harlan, the
limitation of police power and at the same time to uphold the legisla-
21. 198 U.S. at 57.
22. Id. at 64.
23. For an effort proceeding from similar premises, see R. Epstein, supra note 5, at
15-16.
24. 198 U.S. 65-74.
1987]
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tion attacked in Lochner. On the other hand, one could reject both fea-
tures of the Court's approach, as did Justice Holmes in his famous
dissent.
There is, moreover, a close relationship between the two elements
of the Court's approach; the one reinforces the other. The careful scru-
tiny of means-ends connections operates to "flush out" 25 impermissi-
ble ends. If there is no class of impermissible ends, means-ends
scrutiny is incoherent.26 And by impermissible ends, the Court ap-
peared to be referring to what we may call "raw" interest-group trans-
fers.27 Because the only available public justifications were insufficient,
the minimum wage statute was invalidated as an interest-group deal,
reflecting nothing other than political power. Above all, the Court's
concern was that maximum hour legislation was partisan rather than
neutral-selfish rather than public-regarding. 28 It was neutrality that
the due process clause commanded,29 and neutrality was served only by
the general or "public" purposes comprehended by the police power.
If the statute could be justified as a labor or health law, it would be
sufficiently public to qualify as neutral. Since no such justification was
25. SeeJ. Ely, supra note 6, at 146.
26. See Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 Yale LJ.
123 (1972).
27. To say this is not to say that redistribution was always impermissible. Taxation
and other measures might redistribute wealth without running afoul of the due process
clause; and the poor laws were generally immune from constitutional attack. Grey, The
Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 21 (1986). But redistribution on an ad
hoc basis, of the sort represented by maximum hour and minimum wage laws, was un-
constitutional if unsupported by a justification deemed "general" or "public." Cf.
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 381 (1798) (Chase, J.) (discussing natural law principles prohibit-
ing transfers from A to B).
The preference for redistribution through taxation rather than regulation might
have been the product of the broader interest in promoting generality in lawmaking. If
redistribution is ad hoc, it could be perverse and in any event less visible. The require-
ment of generality in redistribution promotes visibility and at the same time ensures that
any redistribution is to those genuinely or most in need. Compare the debate over af-
firmative action, discussed infra text accompanying notes 113-17. The ad hoc character
of affirmative action schemes is sometimes thought to be an argument against them and
in favor of more general methods of alleviating the distribution of benefits and burdens
among blacks and whites. On the other hand, the requirement of generality might allow
well-organized private groups to mobilize in defense of the status quo. In this sense the
requirement fits comfortably with the broader hostility to redistribution.
28. Stated in this way, the requirement remains the law. Statutory classifications
must be defensible as public-regarding under a wide range of constitutional provisions.
See Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689 (1984);
for various defenses, see infra note 166. In the Lochner era, however, the category of
justifications that would count as "public" was small, excluding paternalistic and redis-
tributive matters. Cf. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (rendering
meaningless the public use requirement under the eminent domain clause).
29. Cf. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 1 (1959) (discussing similar requirement of neutrality imposed on judges), dis-
cussed in more detail infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
878 [Vol. 87:873
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available, it was invalidated as impermissibly partisan-what might now
be called special-interest legislation. The legislative result was thus un-
principled; it depended on "whose ox is gored." Under this frame-
work, the common law categories were taken as a natural rather than
social construct. The status of the common law as a part of nature
undergirded the view that the common law should form the baseline
from which to measure deviations from neutrality, or self-interested
"deals." 30
Justice Holmes' celebrated dissenting opinion is a rejection of neu-
trality altogether. It comes close to modem interest-group pluralism,
which treats the political process as an unprincipled struggle among
self-interested groups for scarce social resources.3 1 Under this view,
Lochner's means-ends scrutiny, examining whether there is a "public"
and hence neutral justification for the statute, is difficult to understand.
Holmes' opinion treats the political process as a kind of civil war, in
which the powerful succeed; if courts interfere, they will be bottling up
forces that will express themselves elsewhere in other and more de-
structive forms.3 2 Thus for Holmes, the Constitution does not prevent
"the natural outcome of a dominant opinion." '33
Holmes' opinion is probably best known for its apparent humility:
the rejection of Spencer's Social Statics,34 with which Holmes was sym-
pathetic as a matter of personal predilection; the proposition that the
Constitution does not embody any particular social and economic the-
ory; and its author's apparent willingness to disregard his personal
views in the process of constitutional interpretation. But the opinion is
30. Two qualifications are in order here. First, not every common law right was, by
virtue of its status as such, immunized from collective control. Marginal and not-so-
marginal adjustments were permissible. Nonetheless, the basic framework of the com-
mon law formed the baseline from which to decide cases. Indeed, one can trace to this
period the idea that legislative extinguishment of "core" common law rights was permis-
sible only if the legislature furnished an adequate alternative remedy. See, e.g., New
York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (upholding workers' compensation in
part because of quid pro quo); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,
438 U.S. 59, 88 & n.32 (1978) (upholding liability-limiting provisions of Price-Anderson
Act against due process challenge but suggesting relevance of quid pro quo).
Second, the protection of common law rights depended not merely on the fact that
the rights at issue were protected by the common law, but also on the (unsurprising) fact
that the common law corresponded to a widely held normative theory about the proper
role of government. The interests protected at common law thus tracked the category of
natural rights. For a modern statement, see Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.
Legal Stud. 151 (1973); R. Epstein, supra note 5.
31. See, e.g., R. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956); Stigler, The Theory
of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971); see also R. Posner,
Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform (1985) (making a similar point about Holmes).
32. See Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political In-
fluence, 98 Q.J. Econ. 371 (1983) (making this argument). On Holmes, see Rogat,
Some Modern Views-The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 213 (1964).
33. 198 U.S. at 76.
34. H. Spencer, Social Statics (1882).
1987]
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best understood as an outgrowth of the very species of constitutional
social Darwinism that it purports to reject. Holmes' market-oriented
conception of politics and his skepticism about normative argument are
the very personal building blocks for his enthusiasm for judicial
deference. 35
The decline of the Lochner understanding was slow and wavering.
In some cases the Court upheld statutes by deferring to claims of plau-
sible means-ends connections. Elsewhere the Court seemed gradually
to conclude that redistributive goals were permissibly public and thus
in some sense neutral, even if there was a departure from the common
law; the common law categories thus broke down.3 6 But it was in West
Coast Hotel that the Court rejected the theoretical foundations of the
Lochner period. The case involved a statute providing minimum wages
for women. Perhaps oddly, at least to modem readers, the emphasis of
the opinion was not on the undemocratic character of the Court's previ-
ous approach or on the value ofjudicial deference to legislative deter-
minations.37 Instead the Court stressed the need for minimum wage
regulation, referring to "the exploiting of workers at wages so low as to
be insufficient to meet the bare cost of living" and the fact that "the
exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position with
respect to bargaining power casts a direct burden for their support
upon the community."38 In perhaps the most striking passage of the
opinion, the Court referred to the subsidy problem and added, "[t]he
community may direct its law-making power to correct the abuse which
springs from [employers'] selfish disregard of the public interest."' 39
In the Lochner era itself, of course, the police power could not be
used to help those unable to protect themselves in the marketplace. 40
The expansion of the police power in West Coast Hotel signalled a critical
theoretical shift, amounting to a rejection of the Lochner Court's con-
ception of the appropriate baseline. The key lies in the notion that fail-
ure to act would amount to "a subsidy for unconscionable employers."
The idea that what appears, in the Lochner framework, to be govern-
ment "inaction," or neutrality, might amount to a subsidy is at first
glance quite puzzling. The Court's claim is that the failure to impose a
minimum wage is not nonintervention at all but simply another form of
action-a decision to rely on traditional market mechanisms, within the
35. See, e.g., Rogat, supra note 32, at 251-55; Rogat & O'Fallon, Mr. Justice
Holmes, A Dissenting Opinion-The Speech Cases, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1349 (1984).
36. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Bunting v. Oregon, 243
U.S. 426 (1917); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
37. The Court did, however, refer to these themes. See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S.
at 397-98.
38. Id. at 399.
39. Id. at 399-400.
40. This oversimplifies a complicated framework; the scope of the Lochner era police
power was by no means precisely defined.
[Vol. 87:873
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common law framework, as the basis for regulation.41 West Coast Hotel
rests on an understanding that in any case, government-through mini-
mum wage laws or the common law system-is making a choice. The
common law could not be regarded as a natural or unchosen baseline.
The traditional treatment of the police power was unable to survive this
understanding.42 For the Court in West Coast Hotel, the baseline for
analysis was instead a system in which all workers had a living wage.
Similar developments occurred in other areas of the law. Consider
for example, the law of eminent domain, with which Lochner must be
closely associated: both involved perceived "takings" from A to B, and
an underlying framework built on common law baselines.4 3 Miller v.
Schoene44 tested the constitutionality of a statute requiring the destruc-
tion of ornamental cedar trees infected with a disease damaging to local
apple orchards. The owners of the cedar trees complained that the
statute amounted to a "taking" of their property for which compensa-
tion was constitutionally required. The Court responded that "the
state was under the necessity of making a choice between the preserva-
tion of one class of property and that of the other wherever both ex-
isted in dangerous proximity. It would have been nonetheless a choice
if, instead of enacting the present statute, the state, by doing nothing,
had permitted serious injury to the apple orchards within its borders to
go unchecked. When forced to such a choice the state does not exceed
its constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class
of property in order to save another .... -45 This was so notwithstand-
ing the fact that the injury at issue was not tortious at common law. In
Miller as in West Coast Hotel, adherence to common law baselines no
longer seemed neutral, and departures from those baselines were no
longer impermissibly partisan. The same phenomenon occurred under
the contracts clause, as the Court expanded the range of justifications
that would allow the state to assert its "police power" in order to abro-
gate private agreements. 4 6 In these circumstances it should be unsur-
41. Here the parallel to the affirmative action debate is especially striking. See infra
notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
42. The point is emphasized in L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 8-5 to -7
(1978).
Why this change should have occurred is a complex matter. In part, the Depression
was responsible; in a period of widespread poverty and unemployment, it became
harder to see nineteenth century market ordering as in the interest of all. In part, the
partial but increasing use of government power to alleviate suffering made the common
law system seem less and less natural and inviolate. See id. Consider in this regard
Franklin Roosevelt's suggestion: "We must lay hold of the fact that economic laws are
not made by nature. They are made by human beings." 1 Public Papers of Franklin D.
Roosevelt 657 (1938).
43. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text (discussing the takings clause).
44. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
45. Id. at 279.
46. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
1987]
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prising that Erie v. Tompkins,47 the principal case recognizing the
constructed rather than prepolitical character of the common law, was
decided only one year after West Coast Hotel.
We may thus understand Lochner as a case that failed because it
selected, as the baseline for constitutional analysis, a system that was
state-created, hardly neutral, and without prepolitical status. Once the
Court's baseline shifted, its analysis became impossible to sustain. As
every student of the law of torts is aware, one cannot treat as a "taking"
from A to B a decision to transfer resources to which A had no entitle-
ment in the first place. The whole notion of "taking" depends on a
belief in an antecedent right to the property in question.48 Once the
common law itself was seen to allocate entitlements and wealth, and the
allocation seemed controversial, a decision to generate a new pattern of
distribution could not be for that reason impermissible.
The defect of the Lochner era might, then, be understood in three
ways that are closely related but that have some significant differences
as well. In its narrowest form, the problem was the Court's decision to
take market ordering under the substantive standards of the common
law as the baseline from which to decide constitutional cases.49 In this
formulation, the difficulty lay in the use of the common law as the start-
ing point from which to administer the critical line distinguishing action
from inaction and partisanship from neutrality. More broadly, the
Lochner Court regarded consideration of "whose ox is gored"-when
those helped were the disadvantaged-as impermissible partisanship;
consideration of the plight of the disadvantaged was insufficiently pub-
lic or general and not neutral at all. This conclusion, reflecting a kind
of legal formality, turned out to depend on the antecedent selection of
a baseline grounded in the common law. More broadly still, the Court
took as natural and inviolate a system that was legally constructed and
took the status quo as the foundation from which to measure neutral-
ity.50 The use of the status quo as the foundation for measurement is
of course different from similar use of the common law. We shall see
both uses in the discussion to follow.
These three understandings are closely related to one another.
The decision about what is partisanship and what is neutrality depends
47. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
48. See, e.g., Calabresi & Malamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972); Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967).
49. The terms "common law" and "nineteenth century market ordering" will be
used interchangeably throughout; the reference is to the allocation of rights of use, own-
ership, transfer, and possession of property associated with "laissez-faire" systems and
captured in the common law of the late nineteenth century. Of course common law
systems have not always taken this form, and market ordering could take place under
dramatically different allocations of entitlements.
50. The status quo need not, of course, be the common law.
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on the baseline used for measurement; thus the second defect presup-
poses some variation on the first. The third understanding, stressing
use of the status quo, is in turn simply a generalization of the Lochner
Court's treatment of the common law. For better or worse, these un-
derstandings of the Lochner era treat judicial activism as a secondary
concern. The central problem of the Lochner Court had to do with its
conceptions of neutrality and inaction and its choice of appropriate
baseline.
II. LOCHNER AND CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
This understanding of Lochner is hardly uncontroversial, but vari-
ants have been offered.51 And if Lochner is understood in these terms, it
has not been entirely overruled. Numerous decisions, in widely dispa-
rate areas of constitutional law, depend on Lochner-like baselines and
similar principles of neutrality and inaction; one or more of the under-
standings of Lochner set above are reflected in many areas of current
law. The areas to be covered span a wide range, including affirmative
action, campaign finance regulation, gender discrimination, the state
action doctrine, the distinction between de facto and de jure discrimi-
nation, and judicial review of inaction by federal administrative agen-
cies. The discussion begins with areas using common law baselines and
later shifts to areas in which the status quo is the foundation for
decision.
It is important to understand that for present purposes, the goal is
descriptive rather than normative. To say that a decision depends on
Lochner-like premises is not to say that it was wrong. The normative
issue is dealt with below.
A. Funding Limitations and the First Amendment
We begin with Buckley v. Valeo,52 which involved a first amendment
attack on campaign finance regulation. The regulation at issue im-
51. See B. Ackerman, Reconstructing American Law (1984); L. Tribe, supra note
42, at 427-55; Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1685 (1976); MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1985).
Similar points were made by the legal realists. See Cohen, Property and Sover-
eignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8 (1927); Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-
Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470 (1923).
A question arises here about the criteria for deciding when a particular understand-
ing of the Lochner era, or of any other period, ought to be accepted. Of course the
primary requirement is that the understanding be true to the decided cases-certainly in
terms of result, and, it is to be hoped, in terms of the rhetoric as well. But among
conflicting understandings that fit the cases equally well, the choice has an inescapable
normative dimension. R. Dworkin, Law's Empire 90-98 (1986). On the different impli-
cations of the approach set out here and the more conventional understanding, see infra
notes 167-205 and accompanying text.
52. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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posed a ceiling on campaign expenditures by candidates and political
parties. In defense of the regulation, the government argued that it
sought to equalize the relative ability of individuals and groups to influ-
ence the outcomes of elections. Disparities in wealth, the government
claimed, enabled some to drown out the voices of others. Restrictions
on the speech of the wealthy served the interest of "dissemination of
information from 'diverse and antagonistic sources.' -53 By equalizing
participation in the political realm, campaign finance regulation, it was
said, did not undermine but instead promoted first amendment
interests.
In Buckley, the Court concluded that this justification for regulation
was illegitimate. In the Court's words, "the concept that government
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment."'5 4 The effort at equalization was not within the permissi-
ble ends of government. As far as the first amendment is concerned,
the state must take disparities in wealth, and the existence of some with
more "voice" than others, as part of nature for which government
bears no responsibility. To do otherwise was, for the Buckley Court, a
kind of first amendment "taking."
Buckley is a direct heir to Lochner. In both cases, the existing distri-
bution of wealth is seen as natural, and failure to act is treated as no
decision at all. Neutrality is inaction, reflected in a refusal to intervene
in markets or to alter the existing distribution of wealth. Buckley, like
Lochner, grew out of an understanding that for constitutional purposes,
the existing distribution of wealth must be taken as simply "there," and
that efforts to change that distribution are impermissible. Under both
cases, the category of permissible legislative ends was sharply limited.
To be sure, Buckley was a construction of the first amendment, whereas
Lochner rested on the due process clause; and that distinction may turn
out to be important.55 But whether or not Buckley was rightly decided,
it has much in common with Lochner.
B. Defining Liberty and Property
The due process clause accords procedural protection to "liberty"
and "property," terms that the Court has had some difficulty defining
in recent years.56 The principal problems have arisen in deciding
which, if any, statutory benefits-those said to be "conferred by the
53. Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L. Rev. 323, 336 (quoting Buckley, 424
U.S. at 49).
54. 424 U.S. at 48-49.
55. See infra notes 190-203 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 Cornell L. Rev. 405
(1977); Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1193
(1982); Van Alstyne, Cracks in the New Property, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 445 (1977).
[Vol. 87:873884
HeinOnline  -- 87 Colum. L. Rev. 884 1987
LOCHNER'S LEGACY
goverment"-are entitled to procedural protection.57 For a long pe-
riod the Court concluded that some benefits were "created" by the gov-
ernment, whereas other benefits were not. Only the latter-generally
interests protected by the common law-were entitled to procedural
protection. In the wake of an assault on this position, rejecting Lochner-
like baselines deriving from common law,58 the Court has apparently
concluded that statutory benefits will sometimes be considered "lib-
erty" or "property"- but only when there is a statutory entitlement,
defined as a limitation on the administrator's discretion to provide the
benefit in question.59
Lochner-like premises powerfully influence this debate. For the
most part, liberty and property are defined by reference to the common
law.60 Interests protected at common law-including most promi-
nently the right to private property, the right to bodily integrity, and
other rights protected in the Lochner era-are axiomatically entitled to
protection. The difficulties arise with other sorts of rights, including
the right to freedom from discrimination, the right to government em-
ployment, and the right to welfare. The statutory entitlement approach
is based on a partial rejection of Lochner-era understandings. But the
Court's failure to put benefits said to be created by the government on
the same footing with benefits said to be "natural" is a clear holdover
from the Lochner period. The distinction itself treats the common law as
unchosen and statutory benefits as a form of "intervention"-the same
choice of baseline that affected the Lochner Court. An alternative ap-
proach would have been to select liberty and property interests by ref-
erence to some criterion of importance independent of the common
law, or at least not determined by common law categories. 61
Similar issues have arisen as a matter of substantive due process.
57. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
58. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale
LJ. 733 (1963).
59. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-42.
60. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (bodily integrity). For a
recent statement, see Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 85,
which draws a sharp distinction between common law and statutory interests and which
understands the distinction in Lochner-like terms, as responding to the differences be-
tween interests created by government and interests from some other source.
Sometimes, however, the statutory entitlement approach has been used to remove
even common law interests from the category of liberty and property. See Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693 (1976). Note also that it would be possible to treat common law interests
as protected only because and to the extent that they can be classified as "entitlements";
under this view, the statutory entitlement and common law cases are closer than they
might at first appear. But this sort of positivist approach to liberty and property miscon-
ceives the intended function of the due process clause, which was to protect important
interests from procedural irregularity, regardless of whether there was a state-created
right. See Monaghan, supra note 56, at 433-34, 442-43.
61. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1257-58, for a discussion of the diffi-
culties produced by such an approach.
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In Flemming v. Nestor,62 the Court concluded that social security benefits
were not constitutionally protected "property. ' 63 The same conclusion
has been reached elsewhere, as courts have concluded that government
may eliminate benefits of its own creation-where that notion is defined
by reference to the common law.64 The failure to accord substantive
protection to statutory benefits derives from Lochner era distinctions be-
tween common law interests and other benefits. Similarly, the con-
straints of Article III have been administered under Lochner-like
premises. The Court is less likely to require an Article III tribunal
when a right created by Congress is at stake. The common law thus
defines a large amount of the territory captured by Article III
requirements.6 5
C. State Action
The state action doctrine is a product of an (uncontroversial) un-
derstanding that the Constitution is directed to acts of government
rather than acts of private individuals. But how does one decide
whether government is "acting"? The legal test could in theory de-
pend on whether government agents are involved in the process. But
as the dispute provoked by such cases as Shelley v. Kraemer66 makes
clear, such a test would be inadequate. State officials are involved in
the enforcement of private contract, tort, and property law every day,
and their involvement does not subject all private arrangements to con-
stitutional constraints. Instead, state action doctrine has always de-
pended on a baseline establishing the legitimate or at least ordinary
functions of government. And in setting forth such a theory, and using
it as the basis of inquiry, courts have not merely searched for state "ac-
tion," but instead relied on common law baselines like those in Lochner.
For example, the Constitution is frequently said to be a charter of
"negative" rather than "positive" rights. 67 This understanding can be
found in a number of areas of state action doctrine. When the govern-
ment fails to provide protection against private racial discrimination,
the failure is said not to be "state action" and thus raises no constitu-
tional question.68 Nongovernmental discrimination is created by the
private rather than the public sphere. So too, no constitutional ques-
62. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
63. Id. at 608-11.
64. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 160 (1980).
65. The point emerges explicitly in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric'l Prods. Co., 473 U.S.
568 (1985).
66. 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (invalidating racially restrictive covenant).
67. See, e.g., Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 864 (1986).
68. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 374-77 (1967); see Black, "State Action,"
Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69 (1967); Karst &
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tion is raised when private property owners deny the public access to
their property. As the Court held in Hudgens v. NLRB, 69 the first
amendment is not violated when landowners invoke state trespass law
in order to prevent picketers from displaying their messages on private
lands. All of these issues are resolved by the choice of a Lochner-like
baseline of government "inaction," one that appears neutral and natu-
ral. Neither enforcement of the trespass law nor repeal of laws forbid-
ding private discrimination is taken as state action-a conclusion that
relies upon common law notions about the role of government.
But consider PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins.70 That case in-
volved a decision by the California Supreme Court extending rights of
free speech, under the state constitution, so as to permit people to
picket on privately owned shopping centers. The shopping center own-
ers invoked the due process and takings clauses as a bar to the abroga-
tion of their property rights, as those rights had been understood
before the California court's decision. The Supreme Court upheld the
abrogation, but left no doubt that the partial abrogation of the state law
of trespass was "state action" sufficient to call for constitutional scru-
tiny. Indeed, a fair reading of the opinion is that some abrogations of
state trespass law would amount to an unconstitutional taking-a con-
clusion that should be unexceptionable. Property rights are defined by
state law. Abrogation of trespass law, either with respect to particular
persons or across-the-board, is ordinarily the central meaning of a tak-
ing of property.
Why did the abrogation of trespass law in PruneYard appear uncon-
troversially to be state action, while application of the same law was
understood to be no such thing in Hudgens? Indeed, which case in-
volved "action," and which "inaction"? At first glance, the invocation
of a trespass law might seem more plausibly to be action than the abro-
gation or removal of the very same law. The cases confirm that the
state action inquiry is not a search for whether the state has "acted,"
but instead an examination of whether it has deviated from functions
that are perceived as normal and desirable. And that examination is
powerfully influenced by the common law; thus it is the abrogation
rather than the enforcement of a trespass law that appears to be state
action. The baseline, in short, has been defined in terms that are remi-
niscent of that in Lochner.
It will be useful to return to the treatment of private racial discrimi-
nation. There is general agreement, at least in the courts, 71 that no
constitutional question is raised if a state fails to provide protection
Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 39.
69. 424 U.S. 507, 512-21 (1976).
70. 447 U.S. 74, 82-85 (1980).
71. But see Black, supra note 68, at 83-91; Karst & Horowitz, supra note 68 (relat-
ing Reitman to an "expanding concept" of equality and state responsibility).
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from private racial discrimination, or if a state repeals a statute that had
provided such protection. This understanding is made explicit in one
of the most vexing of modem state action cases, Reitman v. Mulkey. 72 At
issue in Reitman was a California constitutional amendment providing
that no state statute may be enacted that interferes with the private
right to sell property to whomever the property owner chooses. By a
five-to-four vote, the Court invalidated the amendment on the ground
that its purpose and effect were to encourage private racial discrimina-
tion. But the Court was careful to emphasize that the amendment
stood on a very different footing from a "mere" failure to provide pro-
tection against private racial discrimination. 73 For purposes of the
Constitution, PruneYard appeared an easy case, and the failure to pro-
vide protection against trespass was obviously state action; whereas
Reitman was quite difficult, and the failure to provide protection against
racial discrimination was obviously not state action. What accounts for
this?
The answer lies in the fact that the search for state action can be
made coherent only against a background normative theory of the legit-
imate or normal activities of government. Without such a theory, the
search is unguided. It is only because of the persistence of Lochner-like
theory that state action was uncontroversially at stake in PruneYard but
difficult to find in Reitman v. Mulkey. 74 In PruneYard, there was a devia-
tion from the common law baseline. In a case in which the state fails to
provide protection against racial discrimination, or enforces the law of
trespass, there is not. In state action doctrine, as in the Lochner period,
the common law provides the benchmark from which to measure
intervention.
D. Affirmative Rights: Of Welfare and Others
For the last two decades there has been considerable debate about
the existence of affirmative rights against government. 75 The conven-
tional wisdom,76 referred to above, has it that the Constitution is a
charter of negative guarantees-rights against government interfer-
ence-and that "affirmative" rights are exceptional or nonexistent.
Thus it is said that government may not intrude on private rights, but
there is no claim against the government if it has failed to act. The
basic position has resulted in rejection of claims to various public serv-
72. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
73. Id. at 373-77.
74. The distinction may be defended, however, because of the difference between
the first amendment and the equal protection clause; different provisions may repudiate
or incorporate Lochner-like principles. See infra notes 190-203 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 67; Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional
Democracy, 1979 Wash. U.LQ. 659; Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality and the Equal
Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41.
76. Currie, supra note 67; Winter, supra note 75.
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ices, ranging from police protection to welfare. Perhaps the most well-
known example is Harris v. McRae,77 in which the plaintiffs challenged
the government's failure to fund abortions needed by poor women.
The Court held that government had no duty to remove barriers "not
of its own creation."' 78 The idea is that poverty is simply "there"; it is
not a product of government action. By now it should be easy to see
that this idea depends on Lochner-like definitions of neutrality, inaction,
and appropriate baselines.
There is, however, a peculiarity in the notion that the Constitution
does not guarantee "affirmative rights." We have seen that the takings
clause protects against repeals, partial or total, of the trespass laws.
When a state abrogates the law of trespass, it is removing what might
be seen as "affirmative" protection; but its action does not become for
that reason constitutionally acceptable. The protection of private con-
tracts can be understood in similar terms. The contracts clause
amounts to a right to state enforcement of contractual agreements; if
the state fails to protect by refusing to enforce a contract, it is violating
the clause.
Here and elsewhere, it is misleading to understand the Constitu-
tion solely as a guarantor of "negative" rights. The Constitution pro-
tects some rights and not others. Whether rights are treated as
"negative" or "positive" turns out to depend on antecedent assump-
tions about baselines-the natural or desirable functions of govern-
ment. State protection of private property and contract appears to be a
"negative" guarantee because it is so usual, indeed built into the very
concepts of property and contract.79 Provision of welfare is treated dif-
ferently because it is in some respects new and in any event hedged
with limitations and reservations. Here Lochner's premises, having to
do with neutrality and inaction, account critically for current constitu-
tional doctrine with respect to "affirmative" rights.
All this sheds some light on claims of a constitutional right to "af-
firmative" protection. Viewed through the lens of the Lochner period,
claims for "positive rights" cannot be dismissed by reference to the
"negative" character of constitutional guarantees or the word "de-
prive" in the fourteenth amendment. Whether there is a deprivation
depends on antecedent conceptions of entitlement; if there were a pre-
existing right to welfare, the failure to provide it would in fact be a
deprivation. In these circumstances one might argue that there have
always been constitutional rights to certain kinds of positive guaran-
tees, and that in the modern era the right to a minimal level of material
goods, like the right to protection against trespass, has constitutional
status. In mature form, this argument would be quite elaborate, and
77. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
78. Id. at 316.
79. See Currie, supra note 67, at 864-67.
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for present purposes it is unnecessary to say whether the argument
might be made persuasive.80 It should suffice to suggest that cases re-
jecting so-called "affirmative" rights depend on Lochner-like premises.
E. Takings and Contractual Impairments
The most conspicuously Lochner-like provisions in the Constitution
are the contracts and takings clauses, especially in their incorporation
of the status quo and of common law principles. The takings clause,
protecting private property, provides the analytical foundations for
Lochner itself. And it is hard to read the provision without accepting, at
least to some degree, certain premises about neutrality, inaction, and
common law baselines. The contracts clause protects a species of pri-
vate property; it thus grows out of the same framework as Lochner. But
in the last fifty years, the constraints of the contracts and takings clauses
have been significantly curtailed, in part for the same reasons that led
to the abandonment of Lochner itself. These developments suggest,
among other things, that text and animating purposes have been far
from central to decisions about whether to rely on Lochner-like
principles.
The decline of the contracts clause has been a subject of increasing
modern controversy. The clause provides that no state shall enact any
law "impairing the obligations of contracts." For a long period the
clause operated as a significant barrier to government action; the clause
is now for the most part8 l a dead letter. How might this development
be explained?
The answer lies in the dramatic expansion of the police power-in
short, from an understanding based on Lochner to one rooted in West
Coast Hotel. For a long period the contracts clause has permitted states
to abrogate contracts so long as they are operating within the "police
power." If a state bans the sale of heroin, and the ban applies retroac-
tively to prevent enforcement of a contract, there is no constitutional
problem.8 2 The reserved powers of the state, it is said, operate as an
implicit limitation on the power to contract. But if the police power is
understood in Lochner-like terms, there is still enormous room for im-
munity from legislative interference-a claim demonstrated by the in-
terpretation of the contracts clause for much of the nation's history.83
80. See Black, Further Reflections on the Constitutional Right of Livelihood, 86
Colum. L. Rev. 1103 (1986); Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through
the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7 (1969); S. Holmes, Liberal Guilt: Some
Theoretical Origins of the Welfare State in Responsibility, Rights and Welfare (D. Moon
ed. forthcoming 1987).
81. The qualification is necessary because of Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (invalidating statute on contract clause grounds).
82. See Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905). The Court might, however,
have decided that there was a requirement of compensation.
83. See G. Gunther, Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials 487-90 (11th ed.
1985).
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In Home Building Loan Association v. Blaisdell,84 however, the Court read
the police power very broadlyv-thus replicating the outcome in West
Coast Hotel and rendering the contracts clause functionally identical to
the due process clause.
Similar developments occurred under the law of eminent domain.
Here Lochner-like premises might be expected in two places: the inter-
pretation of the "public use" requirement and of the police power ex-
ception to the compensation requirement. The public use requirement
traditionally meant that the property had actually to be used by the
public.8 5 But gradually the requirement was expanded to refer to any
plausible public justification, including those that are redistributive in
character.8 6 Thus it is said that the public use requirement has been
rendered effectively unenforceable, much like the rationality require-
ment of the due process clause post-Lochner.
Moreover, the police power exception to the eminent domain
clause immunizes various regulatory measures from constitutional at-
tack, even if they diminish the value of property. An actual physical
invasion of property is often a prerequisite for a finding of a "taking." 87
All this is a product of an abandonment of Lochner-like baselines. It
would be difficult, however, to abandon those baselines altogether
without reading the contracts and takings clauses out of the Constitu-
tion; in nature, those provisions are Lochner-like, though their scope is
uncertain.88 The narrowing of the scope of the contracts clause has
almost converted it into a constitutional redundancy; the takings clause
is still important in the context of physical invasions.
F. Judicial Review of Agency Inaction
One of the most important issues in modern administrative law is
whether inaction by administrative agencies, defined as the failure to
enforce regulatory statutes, should be subject to the same standards as
administrative action, defined as regulatory enforcement. Under the
traditional approach, agency action is subject to a strong presumption
of reviewability.89 Much of administrative law grows out of an under-
84. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
85. See Dunham, Griggs v. Alleghany County in Perspective: Thirty Years of
Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 63, 66.
86. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-48 (1984); Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981);
Dunham, supra note 85, at 66-71; Note, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Do-
main: An Advance Requiem, 58 Yale LJ. 599 (1949).
87. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31
(1978). An interesting example here is Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n,
106 S. Ct. 903 (1986), in which the Court dealt with the question of "ownership" of
extra space in a billing envelope. The discussion of the plurality, id. at 912-13, assumed
a prepolitical property right in the relevant utility.
88. See infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-41 (1967).
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standing that government may interfere with common law rights only if
it has been authorized to do so by the legislature. 90 Judicial review is
necessary to test the question of authorization.
Under this framework, there is little room for review at the behest
of beneficiaries of statutes. In such suits, no common law right is at
stake. This framework accounts for conventional limitations on the
class of persons entitled to obtain "standing" to review agency action 9
and also for a longstanding presumption against reviewability of agency
inaction.92 In the last decade, there has been a substantial trend
against this traditional understanding,93 as beneficiaries of regulatory
programs have been allowed to challenge unlawful agency inaction.
In its recent decision in Heckler v. Chaney,94 however, the Supreme
Court held that agency inaction should be presumed unreviewable. In
so holding, the Court emphasized that "when an agency refuses to act it
generally does not exercise its coercive power over an individual's liberty
or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon areas that courts
often are called upon to protect." 95
This understanding is a direct modern analogue to Lochner. In
both cases, deviations from the common law status quo demand special
justification. In Heckler, as in Lochner, it is government interference with
the common law allocation that is subject to legal concern. Govern-
mental "inaction" is treated as neutral and legally unobjectionable; in-
deed, it does not furnish a predicate for judicial intervention. In the
context of administrative law, this phenomenon is especially striking.
The rise of the modern administrative state was based largely on a re-
jection of common law ordering. For the proponents of the administra-
tive agency, the common law system was hardly unchosen or neutral,
but was instead highly partisan96-a perception shared, as we have
seen, by the Court in West Coast Hotel and also in Erie. Regulatory inter-
vention was based largely on a substantive rejection of the common law
90. See J. Vining, Legal Identity (1978); Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1672-73 (1975).
91. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 478 (1938).
92. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 181-83 (1967).
93. See, e.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975); Carpet, Linoleum &
Resilient Tile Layers Local 419 v. Brown, 656 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1981); Adams v.
Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973); EDF v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
94. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
95. Id. at 832. Other considerations, quite independent of Lochner, might be
brought forth to support distinctions between review of agency action and review of
agency inaction. In particular, review of inaction implicates concerns having to do with
scarce prosecutorial resources, which make judicial review for arbitrariness harder to
undertake. For a discussion of such considerations, see Sunstein, Reviewing Agency
Inaction after Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653 (1985).
96. See, e.g., J. Landis, The Administrative Process 31-39 (1938); see also Hale,
supra note 51 (criticizing the view that government's proper role is limited to protecting
private property rights).
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system. Administrative law doctrines, rooted in traditional private law,
thus continue to reflect Lochner-like premises despite the repudiation of
those premises during the rise of the administrative state.
G. Standing
Similar considerations apply to the problem of standing. Origi-
nally, only those whose common law interests were at stake had stand-
ing to challenge administrative action. Thus the requirement of a
"legal interest" meant, at its inception, that a litigant must be able to
show that an interest protected by the common law was at stake.97 This
test was built on an analogy to private law. Those adversely affected by
illegality could not always challenge it; it was necessary to show that the
defendant violated some duty owed to plaintiff. Thus the issues of
standing, of a cause of action, and of a persuasive claim on the merits
were inextricably intertwined, in a system of public law that owed its
origin and shape to common law understandings.
Eventually the Court recognized that an interest protected by stat-
ute could also form the predicate for standing.98 Thus competitors and
regulatory beneficiaries might have standing to sue if they had an inter-
est protected by statute. Finally, in Association of Data Processing Service
Organization v. Camp,99 the Supreme Court rejected the legal interest
test altogether, requiring only an injury "in fact" and "arguably within
the zone" of statutory protection in order to test administrative ac-
tion.100 The Data Processing decision has been celebrated as a rejection
of private property as the predicate for judicial intervention in favor of
an approach that calls on courts to ensure the identification and imple-
mentation of public values.101
In three ways, however, modem standing doctrine still contains
principles from the common law. First, the requirement of an injury in
fact is often justified on the ground that officious intermeddlers ought
not to be permitted to disrupt mutually advantageous relationships.1
0 2
This idea is a direct analogue to the common law view insofar as it un-
derstands public law cases in right-duty terms. Second, the notion of
judicial restraint in the law of standing often has built into it a tacit
distinction between the interests of regulatory beneficiaries and those
of regulated industries. The former, it is said, are for the political pro-
cess rather than the courts; the judicial role is said to be the protection
of traditional private rights-a Lochner-like understanding.10 3 This rea-
97. See Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938); Stewart, supra note 90,
at 1723-24.
98. See Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924).
99. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
100. Id. at 153-57.
101. SeeJ. Vining, supra note 90, at 27-33, 38-41, 179-81.
102. See Stewart, supra note 90, at 1739.
103. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984).
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soning is not a tribute to "judicial restraint" in the abstract, but distin-
guishes between two categories of interests in terms of the respective
roles of politics and courts.10 4 This distinction should be quite contro-
versial; it is held over from the Lochner era and its premises were repudi-
ated during the New Deal.
Finally, the Court has recently used various requirements of
"nexus" as a basis for denying standing.' 05 Thus the plaintiff must
show that his injury is attributable to the defendant's conduct and that
the injury is likely to be remedied by a decree in his favor. In such cases
the categorization of the injury is critical; the Court has frequently re-
fused to recognize probabilistic or systemic harms and instead has re-
quired a showing of the sort required by traditional private law. 10 6
Such cases express an understanding that the distinctive judicial role is
to protect traditional sorts of legal harms. In these respects, standing
doctrine, even in the era following Data Processing, continues to be
based on Lochner-like conceptions of the role of the courts. 10 7
H. Racial Discrimination
The law of racial discrimination is centrally affected by Lochner-like
premises, but here the similarity to Lochner lies, not in the use of the
common law, but in notions of action and inaction and in the importa-
tion of the status quo and the existing distribution of wealth and
entitlements.
In particular, three areas of modem discrimination law reflect a
debate between conceptions that can be traced to Lochner and West Coast
Hotel respectively. The same debate can be found in an earlier genera-
tion, during the discussion of the decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,108 and indeed in the most famous use of the term "neutrality" in
constitutional scholarship. In Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 10 9 Professor Herbert Wechsler criticized the opinion in Brown on
the ground that the Court had not supplied a "neutral" justification for
the result. In Wechsler's view, the decision provided a conflict between
two sorts of associational preferences: the desire of blacks to attend
104. This approach is especially questionable when the legal claim is statutory
rather than constitutional; in such cases, statutory beneficiaries have already won in the
political process. See Wright, 468 U.S. at 737.
105. See id.; Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 426 U.S. 26 (1976);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
106. See Wright, 468 U.S. at 737; Simon, 426 U.S. at 26; Warth, 422 U.S. at 490.
107. There is an irony here. Case-or-controversy limitations were originally based
largely on concerns, associated with Justice Frankfurter, that "progressive" programs
should not readily be subject to judicial challenge; the limitations were thus rooted in
anti-Lochner efforts to immunize from judicial challenge revisions in the common law. In
recent years, such limitations have been used so as to prevent those challenging govern-
ment action to do so if a common law interest is not at stake.
108. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
109. 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
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school with whites, and the desire of whites to attend school without
blacks. So far as Wechsler was concerned, no neutral principle had
been brought forward to permit a choice between these two sets of
preferences. 010 The decision depended on "whose ox was gored," and
was thus not shown to be neutral."'
This criticism has a powerful Lochner-like dimension. The existing
distribution of power and resources as between blacks and whites
should be taken by courts as simply "there"; neutrality lies in inaction;
it is threatened when the Court "takes sides" by preferring those disad-
vantaged. Like the minimum wage legislation in Lochner, and for similar
reasons, the attack on school segregation appeared impermissibly parti-
san to some of Brown's critics.
In both cases, moreover, the appropriate response derives from
West Coast Hotel: the existing distribution is not natural and does not
provide a neutral baseline; it resulted in part from government deci-
sions; efforts to improve the lot of the disadvantaged fall comfortably
within the police power, should not be treated as impermissibly parti-
san, and may even be constitutionally compelled, especially where there
is racial discrimination on the face of a statute. Indeed, the notion that
the associational preferences of whites and blacks shold be treated the
same seems to have an otherworldly quality. To some degree, of
course, Wechsler's objection was institutional. He was requiring of
courts a justification of the sort that the Lochner Court required of legis-
latures. The category of neutral principles, as he understood it, was
analogous to the police power as understood by the Lochner Court.
Both forbade consideration of the plight of the disadvantaged as a suffi-
ciently neutral or general reason for action. But the institutional differ-
ences should not deflect attention from the same basic normative
foundation. In both cases, "taking sides" in favor of the disadvantaged
seemed impermissibly partisan." 12
110. Id. at 31-34. Consider the parallel to contemporary debates over affirmative
action, where favoring blacks over whites is also said to be neutral. See generally
Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99, for an argument that af-
firmative action is not in principle different from nondiscrimination.
111. Thus understood, Wechsler's view imposed sharp constraints on judges.
A more modest formulation of the requirement of neutral principles is set out in
Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 982
(1978), where the requirement is understood to be a largely procedural injunction thatjudges conduct a kind of internal Socratic dialogue. Wechsler's view appeared to im-
pose a substantive constraint, forbidding consideration of "whose ox is gored," in a way
that borrows from Lochner era conceptions of neutrality. Id. at 1001-13. The relation-
ship between the procedural and substantive versions of the requirement of neutral
principles precisely parallels the relationship between the modern requirement of ra-
tionality review and the understanding of the Lochner Court. In both Wechsler's view
and that of the Lochner Court, impermissible ends are ruled out.
112. Here, of course, the problem does not stem from use of common law
baselines.
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Similar considerations can be found, in somewhat different form,
in several areas of modem discrimination law.
1. Affirmative Action. - It is now clear that "affirmative action"-
discrimination in favor of traditionally disadvantaged groups-will be
treated more leniently than discrimination against members of such
groups.11 3 But the validity of a particular affirmative action scheme will
depend on a variety of factors: the nature of the institution that made
the decision; the flexible or inflexible character of the scheme; the na-
ture of the harm to members of the majority; and, perhaps most impor-
tant, the existence of "findings" to the effect that the institution
engaging in affirmative action has discriminated in the past. 1 4 The fi-
nal factor has been the most sharply disputed among the justices. The
dispute centers on when, if ever, past societal discrimination is a suffi-
cient predicate for an affirmative action scheme, or whether affirmative
action must be justified by a more particularized showing of discrimina-
tory conduct on the part of the institution in question. Current indica-
tions are that societal discrimination is insufficient. 51 5
The constitutional attack on affirmative action depends on a per-
ception that the natural course is to rely on market measures. The
Constitution, in this view, requires government to allocate employment
and other opportunities according to criteria that have nothing to do
with race. To distinguish discrimination against blacks from discrimi-
nation against whites is not neutral; it makes the issue depend on
"whose ox is gored." Government intervention to redress social dis-
crimination, or some other harm, is partisan. Indeed, the suggestion in
Adkins-that individuals should not be singled out for burdens that
ought to be placed on the public as a whole-is very close to the under-
standing that underlies contemporary attacks on affirmative action. But
if the current position of blacks is thought not simply to be "there," but
instead to be a product of past and present social choices, the argument
for affirmative action becomes much more powerful."t 6 No require-
ment of "neutrality" would be understood as mandating measures that
are (or seem) indifferent to race. The constitutional arguments for and
against affirmative action thus track the arguments for and against mini-
mum wage legislation.
Indeed, the very term "affirmative action"-ironically, embraced
by defenders of the practice-is based on Lochner-like premises. The
term suggests that indifference to race (understood here as "inaction")
is the natural course, that discriminatory effects deriving from color-
113. Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442
(1987); Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
114. See cases cited supra note 113.
115. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
116. Cf. Strauss, supra note 110, at 100-08 (suggesting that the antidiscrimination
principle and affirmative action are compatible rather than conflicting).
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blind rules are simply "there," and that something that counters those
effects should be labelled "affirmative." The terms "affirmative" and
"action" both rely on Lochner-like conceptions of appropriate baseline;
both understand respect for the status quo and the existing distribution
of power and resources as the point of departure for constitutional
analysis. Moreover, racial discrimination is objectionable because of its
purposes and effects; discrimination against blacks is usually accompa-
nied by racial hostility on the part of the discriminators, and its effect is
to perpetuate the social subordination of blacks. Critics of "affirmative
action" take advantage of the rhetorical power of the notion of racial
discrimination in a context in which the reasons for that rhetorical
power-the purposes and effects of discrimination-are not at work
and indeed argue in the other direction. Thus it is that Lochner-like
premises infect the affirmative action controversy.
2. Discriminatory Effects. - The Supreme Court has now made it
clear that a showing of discriminatory intent is necessary in order to
make out a violation of the equal protection clause.' 17 Discriminatory
effects are in themselves insufficient. Thus, for example, if a facially
neutral test for police officers happens to exclude a disproportionate
number of blacks, there is no equal protection problem even if the test
has little relation to capacity to perform the job.
The Court has required proof of discriminatory purpose in part
because of a concern that if discriminatory effects were enough, numer-
ous government decisions would be called into constitutional doubt. 1 18
Wealth and opportunities correlate with race; a disproportionate
number of blacks are poor, uneducated, unable to perform well on
standard examinations, the perpetrators (and victims) of crimes, and so
forth. Building on private law models of culpability, the Court has thus
concluded that the Constitution is violated only when there is an intent
to discriminate, not when discriminatory outcomes are produced by
government actions that do not take race into account.
This understanding also depends on a Lochner-like premise that
discriminatory effects are simply "there," so that the course of neutral-
ity lies in indifference to race (what appears and is treated as inac-
tion).' 19 But if discriminatory effects were seen as partly the product of
past discrimination by the state, it would be hard to treat them as natu-
ral and unobjectionable. If disproportionate harms to blacks result
from a legacy of discrimination, a set of legal doctrines that treated
117. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
118. The point is made explicitly in Washington v. Davis. See id. at 239-41.
119. The intent test, as set out in such cases as Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256 (1979), also disregards the phenomenon of selective racial care and indiffer-
ence. Under Feeney the question is whether the government actor made the decision
"because of" not merely "in spite of" its racially discriminatory effects. Id. at 279. But
the equality question should be whether the actor would have made the decision regard-
less of which group was helped and which hurt. Such an inquiry would also turn on intent, but
it would call into question a larger number of government decisions.
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such harms as constitutionally troublesome would hardly seem odd.
Doctrine based on compensatory goals would be a permissible and per-
haps mandatory course.
3. Dejure/defacto. - For a long period it was unclear whether de
facto segregation was a cause for constitutional concern.1 20 De facto
segregation, largely in the North, is said to arise from the voluntary
choices of blacks and whites; de jure segregation is the product of law.
But here, as in the case of affirmative action, the terminology itself rests
on Lochner-like premises. The notion of de facto segregation suggests
that segregation simply happened; it is "just there." But if the exist-
ence of patterns of segregation were seen as an outgrowth of the legacy
of racial discrimination, an attack on "de facto" segregation might have
been more plausible. There may be good reasons to immunize some
kinds of segregation from legal control, but the doctrinal distinction
depends partly on understandings of neutrality and inaction that are
close cousins of Lochner.
I. Gender Discrimination
In the last two decades, the Court has given "heightened scrutiny"
to discrimination against women, invalidating a wide range of statutes.
Sometimes the Court invalidates statutes because they are based on in-
accurate stereotypes.12' But the difficult cases arise when the Court
faces measures reflecting differences that are in some sense real. Con-
sider, for example, Califano v. Goldfarb,122 involving a statute allowing
spouses of men automatically to qualify for social security benefits, but
requiring spouses of women to establish dependency; Craig v. Boren,123
invalidating a law prohibiting boys from drinking alcoholic beverages
until age twenty-one, but allowing girls to drink at age eighteen; Missis-
sippi University for Women v. Hogan,124 involving a nursing school limited
to women; and Rostker v. Goldberg,125 upholding a law requiring men but
not women to register for the military draft. In all of these cases, the
statute under attack responded, albeit sometimes crudely, to differ-
ences between men and women that were in some sense real. On what
basis did the Court invalidate the first three measures?
A clue can be found in Craig v. Boren, where the Court, responding
to statistics showing that boys tended to be cited for drunk driving
more often than girls, said that statistical demonstrations are "in ten-
sion with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection
120. See G. Stone, L. Seidman, C. Sunstein & M. Tushnet, Constitutional Law
558-59, 567-75 (1986).
121. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
122. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
123. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
124. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
125. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
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Clause."1 26 In all of these cases, the differences, even if "real," are not
simply there, but are at least to some degree' 27 artifactual: a product of
cultural forces, including the legal system, that have created and per-
petuated differences between the sexes. Thus in Goldfarb, the fact that
men tend to be wage-earners more often than women was not treated
as exogenous to the legal system. Indeed, the fact was reinforced as
such, even if in a minimal way, by the very statute in Goldfarb, which
made the package of benefits more attractive for men than for women
and tended to make it more desirable for men to work. Thus in the
Hogan case, the Court said that the statute at issue "makes the assump-
tion that nursing is a field for women a self-fulfilling prophecy."' 128
Rostker is a striking contrast. There the Court reasoned that since
Congress had excluded women from combat, the difference in registra-
tion requirements responded to "real differences" between men and
women. But those real differences were a product of law; it was a stat-
ute that created them. Rostker is in this sense reminiscent of a wide
range of earlier cases failing to recognize the constructed character of
gender distinctions and upholding discrimination because of a percep-
tion that subordination of women was a part of nature. 129
With the exception of Rostker, the cases under discussion derive
from a partial rejection of Lochner-like principles that would take gender
differences as exogenous variables, and would understand neutrality to
lie in reasonable responses to those differences. 130 To this extent, the
126. 429 U.S. at 204.
127. Two qualifications are necessary here. First, it is not necessary to ask to what
degree gender differences have a biological component. Even if there is such a compo-
nent, it hardly justifies the measures at issue in most cases; it is by no means clear that
the legal system should turn biological differences into social disadvantages. The point
here is that Lochner-like reasoning would take gender differences as a proper basis for
legal differentiation, no matter their source, and that some of the current law of gender
discrimination is opposed to such reasoning. Cf. C. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified
(1987) (discussing ways in which legal system naturalizes discrimination against women).
The second problem lies in deciding when something is artifactual or not. A strong
view of the lesson of the Lochner period is that everything is-precisely because govern-
ment decisions not to change matters are, after all, decisions. In this view, qualifications
of the sort in the text-suggesting that gender differences, poverty, and the distribution
of benefits and burdens along racial lines are "partly" a product of the legal system-are
unnecessary and misleading. Such qualifications themselves import Lochner-like
premises.
128. 458 U.S. at 730. Compare the suggestion inJ. Ely, supra note 6, at 153, that
prejudice is "the lens that distorts reality," an understanding that depends on the prem-
ise that there is a prepolitical reality that law should reflect. See C. MacKinnon, Femi-
nism Unmodified 40-42 (1987).
129. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
Note, however, that in Rostker the plaintiffs had conceded the legality of the combat
restriction, so the Court's conclusion was perhaps defensible in context.
130. Cf. Strauss, supra note 110, at 108-13 (exploring how rational responses to
racial differences might justify racist classifications). See also the discussion of rape in
Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale LJ. 1087 (1986); MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method & the
State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 Signs 635 (1983).
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law of gender discrimination is an outgrowth of ideas that abandon the
status quo as a neutral baseline and instead rely on a baseline of gender
equality operating to some extent as a criticism of the existing order.
But many areas of the law of gender discrimination share Lochner-like
premises. Consider, in addition to the Rostker decision, cases finding
discriminatory effects insufficient for constitutional invalidation;' 3 1 de-
cisions permitting employers to exclude fertile women from employ-
ment when actual or potential fetuses may be endangered;13 2 and
Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court,133 upholding distinctions in
age for statutory rape. Above all, cases involving discrimination on the
basis of actual or potential pregnancy, or control of reproductive func-
tions, are Lochner-like to the extent that they turn differences that are
often regarded as natural into legal disadvantages.' 3 4 In this sense, Roe
v. Wade itself might be seen as profoundly anti-Lochner insofar as it ac-
corded to women the power to make a decision that it had been previ-
ously thought was not theirs because of nature.13 5
To say that such cases treat gender differences as real, when the
social and legal meaning of those differences is a decision of the legal
system, is not necessarily to say that they were wrongly decided.13 6 But
it is to suggest that they depend on Lochner-like premises about
neutrality.
J. Preferences and the Law
Both public and private law generally take private preferences as
the appropriate basis for social choice. In private law, paternalism
tends to be disfavored,' 3 7 and the most well-known conceptions of
public law understand the purpose of legislation to be the aggregation
131. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
132. See generally Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1219 (1986).
133. 450 U.S. 464 (1981). Although the reasoning in Michael M depended on
Lochner-like premises, the outcome might be defended on quite different grounds. See
Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 387
(1984).
134. C. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women 119-27 (1979).
135. See Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirma-
tive Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 330 (1985). But the
general effort in the law of gender discrimination to examine whether differences are
.,real," or to understand gender discrimination in terms of irrational distinctions reflects
Lochner-like reasoning.
136. Even if the differences are in some sense a product of biology, it is hardly clear
that the legal system should recognize them; it is the legal system that makes such
differences count, and legal ratification may itself be a form of discrimination. See C.
MacKinnon, supra note 134, at 116-27 (discussing how differences are turned into dis-
advantages); L. Tribe, Constitutional Choices 238-45 (1985).
137. The most extreme views come from some law and economics and rights-based
theorists. See R. Epstein, supra note 5 (presenting Lockean theory of "takings" clause);
R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (3d ed. 1986).
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of private preferences.' 3 8 To this degree, preferences are treated in
Lochner-like fashion as exogenous variables; and legal interferences with
those preferences are generally thought to be partisan and illegitimate.
The processes of preference formation and the-possibility of distorting
factors are generally not a subject for legal inquiry. 139
Sometimes, however, constitutional courts conclude that prefer-
ences are a product of some kind of distortion. Consider, for example,
the constitutional hostility to freedom-of-choice plans as a remedy for
school segregation. 140 At first glance it is hard to see why such plans
should be objectionable, for they allow blacks and whites to send their
children to whatever schools they prefer. If the result is continuing
segregation, the problem might be thought to lie in private choices
rather than in the legal system.
The Court's hostility to such plans depends at least in part on a
conclusion that the preferences of whites and blacks are distorted by
the history of discrimination. 14 Blacks may prefer not to send their
children to predominantly white schools because of a fear of racial hos-
tility and antagonism. Whites may be reluctant to send their children to
black schools because of racial prejudice brought about at least in part
through law. In these circumstances, the preferences are not simply
"there" and to be taken as natural; they are a result of legal structures,
and remedial measures must take that into account.
A similar issue is raised by Palmore v. Sidoti,142 in which the Court
invalidated a child custody plan giving preferences to parents of the
same race as the child. The Court said that the state may not sanction
racial prejudice through law, but it is unclear why the Constitution
should forbid government from taking into account the reality of pri-
vate racism. Here too the answer depends on a perception that racism
is not simply exogenous; it is a product of public and private choices
and is properly subject to legal remedy. The same considerations apply
in the area of gender. What emerges is therefore a system that gener-
ally treats preferences as exogenous and a proper basis for social
138. See Bork, supra note 7, at 2-3; R. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory
(1956); R. Posner, supra note 137.
139. See Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1129 (1986).
But note here that in the Lochner era, regulation of "morals" was frequently permit-
ted even outside of the context of harm to others. In this sense, the Lochner Court did
not take all preferences for granted. But see Epstein, Conference Proceedings, 417 U.
Miami L. Rev. 49, 74 (1987) (suggesting that basis of the regulation of morals actually
was harm to others).
140. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). See Gewirtz, Choice in the
Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 728
(1986).
141. See Gewirtz, supra note 140, at 745-48. There is also a collective action prob-
lem here. Individual black families may rationally decide not to send their children to
white schools, even though it would be in their interest if all black families did so.
142. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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choice, but that in certain limited contexts 143 concludes that prefer-
ences reflect relations of power brought about by, among other things,
the legal system itself.
III. ABANDONING LOCHNER
We have seen that Lochner has many progeny in modern constitu-
tional law.' 44 Sometimes, as in Buckley and Wygant, Lochner-like prem-
ises are used as a basis for invalidating government measures.
Sometimes, as in Harris v. McRae and Washington v. Davis, premises of
that sort are used in order to uphold such measures. Nor is the prob-
lem limited to constitutional provisions protecting individual rights.
The structural provisions of the Constitution were designed partly to
protect private property and liberty from government incursion. 145
The rise of the modem administrative state is based largely on a per-
ception that aggressive governmental action, repudiating the common
law, has become necessary. 146 One of the most important tasks of
modem constitutional theory is to implement the original purposes of
the structural provisions in a time when traditional conceptions of lim-
ited government have been repudiated. 147
The claim that there is in many areas of current public law an ana-
lytic connection to Lochner is only descriptive, and it does not necessar-
143. The limitation derives from a fear that if the legal system is generally permit-
ted to intervene whenever preferences are "distorted," lines will become difficult or im-
possible to draw and the range of permissible interventions will be limitless. See
Sunstein, supra note 139, at 1169-73, for general discussion; on the related problem of
"false consciousness," see also J. Elster, Making Sense of Marx (1984).
144. The issue arises in private law as well. One might, for example, understand
the Coase theorem as above all a rejection of Lochner-like approaches to such concepts as
causation, action, and inaction. Cf. B. Ackerman, Reconstructing American Law 46-71
(1984) (discussing effect of Coase theorem on the way lawyers structure the facts).
Much private law theory in the past two decades has attempted to come to terms with
the destabilizing effect of the Coase theorem-just as public law theory has had to face
the confusions produced by abandonment of common law baselines.
145. See H. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (1967); J. Nedelsky, Private
Property and the American Conception of Representative Government (1984) (unpub-
lished manuscript).
146. See Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. (forth-
coming 1987); J. Landis, supra note 96 (rejecting traditional conceptions of separation
of powers).
147. See Sunstein, supra note 146; B. Ackerman & W. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty
Air (1981); Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: The Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573 (1984).
Statutory interpretation is affected by Lochner-like premises as well-most familiarly
in the notion that "statutes in derogation of the common law should be narrowly con-
strued," but in more modern approaches as well. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Statutes' Do-
mains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (1983), which amounts to an argument that when there are
statutory "gaps," courts should resolve all doubts in favor of market ordering. See also
Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An
Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223 (1986) (defining factional tyranny in part
by reference to departures from the common law). An important task is to develop
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ily argue for doctrinal change. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine a
constitutional system that did not have some premises in common with
Lochner. The framers themselves shared those premises, and versions
can be found at every stage of American constitutionalism. But the ar-
gument for Lochner-like premises is conceptual as well as historical. It is
hard to escape Lochner in thinking about this or any other legal system;
its premises are built into our language itself. 148 Without some founda-
tions or baselines from which to make measurements, legal analysis
cannot go forward, and in some cases it is hard to dispute that under-
standings like those reflected in the common law or the status quo are
the appropriate baseline. The point is buttressed by the fact that in any
legal system, one should hope for some degree of continuity over time.
The current system owes its foundations to the common law. It would
be most surprising, and probably undesirable, to find those founda-
tions entirely abandoned.' 49
But Lochner was wrongly decided, and one of the reasons that it was
wrong is that it depended on baselines and consequent understandings
of action and neutrality that were inappropriate for constitutional anal-
ysis. The New Deal to a large degree rejected those understandings,
and the rejection has only partly found its way into law. Which, if any,
of current doctrines should be abandoned for the same reason? How
should constitutional law proceed if it is to escape its roots in Lochner-
like reasoning? It is difficult to answer these questions in the abstract;
whether and how Lochner-like premises should be rejected is too large a
question to discuss as a whole. This section ventures some thoughts on
the relevant inquiries.
A. Naturalness and the Problem of Baseline
The Lochner Court chose the status quo, as reflected in market or-
dering under the common law system, as the baseline for measurement
of departures from neutrality and of action and inaction. There are
approaches to statutory construction that are not based on hostility to departures from
common law categories.
The same view is reflected in approaches to administrative law that distinguish be-
tween the rights of statutory beneficiaries and those of regulated class members. See
Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 345 (suggesting that ordinary concerns supporting procedural safeguards do
not apply when statutory beneficiaries are the complainants); Smith, Judicialization: The
Twilight of Administrative Law, 1985 Duke L.J. 427 (suggesting that the principal con-
cern of administrative law is the protection of private property).
See also Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 56; Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the
Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 892
(1982), for related discussions of the use of supplemental principles in statutory
construction.
148. See G. Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal
About the Mind (1987).
149. Cf. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 Yale L.J. 1567,
1599-1605 (1985) (suggesting a Burkean understanding of the legal system).
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often good reasons to abandon that baseline, at least as a general
rule.150 The common law is not prepolitical; its conception of the func-
tion of the state has been repudiated by the political branches of gov-
ernment, and for good reasons. Constitutional and statutory
interpretation is properly informed by this repudiation.15 1 Efforts to
change the common law framework are not by virtue of the fact consti-
tutionally suspect, and measures that respect that framework are not
"inaction" necessarily to be immunized from legal scrutiny. Use of the
status quo as a baseline is. sometimes objectionable for similar reasons.
Consider the fact that discrimination on the basis of race is responsible
for the existing distribution of benefits and burdens along racial lines.
If the baseline provided by the common law or the status quo is
abandoned, there are two principal alternatives. One possible response
to the decline of Lochner would be to conclude that constitutional courts
ought to play little or no role in deciding whether the existing distribu-
tion of wealth and entitlements should be changed. Associated with
one strand in the New Deal but presaged by Holmes' Lochner opinion,
this view appears prominently in Learned Hand's lectures on the Bill of
Rights, 152 James Landis' work on administrative law, 153 and the opin-
ions of Justice Frankfurter.' 54
Under the Holmesian view it does not matter, for constitutional
purposes, whether the state is reaffirming or rejecting the common law,
or whether it is dramatically changing the existing allocation of entitle-
ments and power. The abandonment of common law baselines re-
quires an abandonment of baselines altogether, at least for purposes of
constitutional law. Neutrality is not required because it cannot be
achieved; all legal categories are socially constructed and irreducibly
subjective.' 55 Such an approach would mean that the basic terms of
social life are for political rather than legal determination.' 56
Sometimes this view is founded on interest-group pluralism;'5 7
sometimes it is derived from skepticism about the notion of objectiv-
150. See the discussion of baselines in Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Prob-
lem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293 (1984).
151. I collapse a complex argument here. Cf. B. Ackerman, supra note 144 (inter-
preting the New Deal as a structural amendment of the Constitution). One need not
accept Ackerman's view in order to recognize that the developments in the New Deal
bear on the interpretation of ambiguous constitutional provisions.
152. See L. Hand, The Bill of Rights (1958).
153. SeeJ. Landis, supra note 96.
154. See, e.g., West Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
155. Cf. Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 1151 (discuss-
ing the constructed character of legal categories).
156. The tradition discussed here did not apply its usual skepticism to its own prin-
ciples about the primacy of democratic politics; if it had, this conclusion would have
been harder to reach.
157. See supra note 31.
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ity s5 8 and about distinctions between reason and power.15 9 For those
who believe in interest-group pluralism, efforts to ensure neutrality, in
the form of public-regarding legislation, ignore the inevitably self-inter-
ested character of political behavior. Neutrality, however understood,
is thus inconsistent with the very nature of politics. 1 60 The conclusion
is that baselines should be rejected for purposes of constitutional law;
courts should uphold legislation except in the most extreme cases. For
those skeptical about objectivity, neutrality is an unacceptable effort to
privilege a position that is itself contingent and likely to reflect some
kind of social interest. 16 1 At its most general level, this concern is re-
flected in a wide range of work questioning the legacy of the Enlighten-
ment.16 2 This position offers obscure guidance for constitutional
courts; it counsels a general rejection both of neutrality and of base-
lines, but at least in some forms, it offers no alternative position from
which to decide cases.
Approaches that follow Holmes and abandon baselines for the pur-
poses of constitutional law, like the approach in Lochner, have the ad-
vantage of easy administration; they are reflected in some of current
law under the contracts, due process, and takings clauses; and they can
claim as well a proper appreciation of democratic values. 163 The
Holmesian abandonment of baselines is of course reflected in tradi-
tional understandings of the lesson of the Lochner period. The decision
158. See T. Nagel, The View from Nowhere (1986); R. Bernstein, Beyond Objectiv-
ism and Relativism (1983).
159. Compare M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other
Writings, 1972-77 (C. Gordon ed. 1981) (suggesting that knowledge depends on partic-
ular constellations of interest) with J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests
(1971) (suggesting possibility of escaping power through communication). For recent
discussion, see Nagel, supra note 158.
160. Compare Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197 (1976) (set-
ting forth this conception of legislation) with R. Dworkin, supra note 51 (arguing in
favor of efforts to create "integrity" in law). On this approach to the interpretation of
statutes, compare Easterbrook, supra note 147, at 539-44, with Posner, Legal Formal-
ism, Legal Realism, and the Interpetation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 179 (1987).
161. See M. Foucault, supra note 159. Cf. Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered,
101 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1987) (challenging neutrality). But see J. Habermas,
Autonomy and Solidarity (1986) (challenging tendency to relativism and irrationalism in
Foucault).
162. SeeJ. Derrida, Of Grammatology (G. Spivak trans. 1976); M. Foucault, supra
note 159; J. Kristeva, Desire in Language (1980); G. Lakoff, supra note 148; R. Rorty,
Consequences of Pragmatism (1982). Despite the enormous differences among them,
all are united in their skepticism about Enlightenment reason. J. Habermas, supra note
161, contains a brief summary at one of the most well-known responses; see also J.
Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization of Society (1984).
163. See, e.g.,J. Ely, supra note 6, at 105-34; R. Posner, supra note 137, at 581-87;
Bork, supra note 7, at 18-19; Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the
Judiciary, 7 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 87 (1984); Monaghan, supra note 7, 395-96.
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whether to accept those understandings is inescapably normative, and
the traditional view might be defended on the foregoing grounds.
In so extreme a form, however, this position is unacceptable pre-
cisely because it is based on odd understandings of republicanism 164
and of the workings of majoritarianism.165 The Holmesian position
would result in a failure to enforce many constitutional provisions that
invite judicial use of baselines, sometimes deriving from the common
law, and that are self-conscious limits on the ability of government to
restructure or to fail to restructure the existing order. Consider the
first amendment, the takings clause, the equal protection clause, and
the contracts clause, all of which impose limits on governmental power.
Moreover, neutrality- understood not as preservation of market order-
ing or as disregard of past discrimination but as a requirement of a
public-regarding justification for legislation-continues to be required,
and for good reasons. 166 The Holmesian position, reflected in some
traditional thinking about Lochner, would amount to an abandonment of
constitutionalism altogether. Its crude and conclusory references to
the primacy of electoral politics are insufficient to support that
abandonment. 167
A third approach would avoid the difficulties associated with both
Lochner and the Holmesian alternative, but it would carry with it large
164. Consider, for example, the interpretation of Madison in Bork, supra note 7, at
2-3, suggesting that in a Madisonian system majorities are allowed to rule in some areas
of life "for no better reason than that they are majorities." Compare the interpretation
in D. Epstein, The Political Theory of The Federalist 178 (1984) (suggesting that the
system was intended to ensure a large measure of deliberation on the part of national
representatives).
165. Some of the problems here include the difficulties, stressed in public choice
theory, in aggregating private preferences through majority rule. See, e.g., W. Riker,
Liberalism vs. Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the
Theory of Social Choice (1982). Moreover, for various reasons some preferences
should not be counted, see Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in Foundations of Social
Choice Theory (J. Elster & A. Hylland eds. 1986). Consider also the slippage between
constituent pressures and legislative outcomes, and the various obstacles, captured in
the collective action problem, to accurate preference-aggregation through majoritarian-
ism, see R. Hardin, Collective Action (1982). On these various questions, see generally
Sunstein, Constitutions and Democracies: An Epilogue, in Constitutionalism and De-
mocracy (J. Elster & R. Slagstaad eds. forthcoming 1988).
166. That requirement has a disciplining effect, albeit a weak one, on the sorts of
measures that can be proposed and enacted, and also tends to transform the nature of
political discourse in desirable ways. See Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in Founda-
tions of Social Choice Theory (J. Elster & A. Hylland eds. 1986); Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29 (1985); Sunstein, Naked Prefer-
ences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689 (1984). In the area ofjudicial deci-
sion, the requirement of neutrality-in the form of an effort to justify differential
treatment-remains important, see R. Dworkin, supra note 51 at 176-224; Greenawalt,
supra note 11I, at 989, 992. That requirement is the judicial analogue of the require-
ment of public-regardingness imposed on legislators, and in neither context should it be
confused by importation of Lochner-like premises.
167. See supra notes 164-65 (suggesting that majoritarianism, understood in plu-
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problems of its own. That approach would attempt to generate a base-
line independent of either the common law or the status quo through
some theory ofjustice, to be derived from the language and animating
purposes of the text and based to a greater or lesser degree on existing
interpretations. Such an endeavor would require a theory of interpre-
tation, a theory of institutional role, and a theory ofjustice. The effort
would be the legal analogue to the various efforts in modem political
theory to go beyond or replace classically liberal social contract theo-
ries. 168 The text would be the foundation for a theory169 that would be
independent of common law ordering, or the status quo, and would
serve as a basis for evaluating it. Approaches of this sort might treat
the Constitution as a unit, reflecting a single overarching theory. For
reasons explored below, it would be preferable to proceed provision-
by-provision, 170 constructing theories for each constitutional clause
and allowing considerable variation among them. Helpful guidance
can be found in republican theories of politics, which carry with them
substantive constraints 171 and whose premises are highly congenial to
ralist fashion, does not capture the view of the framers and is not likely to provide desir-
able outcomes).
A closely related approach would attempt to cabin judicial discretion by referring to
the intent of the framers, the text of the Constitution, or some other limitation on judi-
cial discretion. Such an approach would reflect a belief that because of the problems
posed by democratic theory for an aggressive judicial role, constitutional courts ought
not to rely on principles of distributive justice at all. See Monaghan, supra note 7, at
374; Easterbrook, supra note 163, at 91, 97.
That view cannot be dealt with in detail here; it has been amply discussed else-
where. Partial responses are set out in Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 204 (1986); Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 469 (1981); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Life, 38 Stan. L. Rev.
29 (1985); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781 (1983). Such responses point out the difficul-
ties of "applying" the framers' judgments in changed circumstances; the difficulties of
deciding at what level of generality "intent" should be read; the problem of ascertaining
the framers' intentions with respect to interpretation; the various difficulties faced by
majoritarianism in aggregating private preferences; and the fact that it is by no means
self-evident that a well-functioning democracy merely reflects constituent preferences.
A final position on such matters is of course necessary in order to decide whether the
Holmesian understanding of the Lochner period should be accepted in favor of the ap-
proach set out here.
168. See, e.g., B. Ackerman, SocialJustice in the Liberal State (1980); R. Dworkin,
supra note 7; J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (T. McCarthy trans.
1984); J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). For present purposes it is unnecessary to
say whether and how such an approach would build on novel understandings of neutral-
ity or generate baselines on some independent grounds. Compare various feminist ap-
proaches to the neutrality criterion, set out in A. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human
Nature (1984); N. Hartsock, Money, Sex, and Power: Toward a Feminist Historical Ma-
terialism (1985); MacKinnon, supra note 130; Minow, supra note 161.
169. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
170. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
171. See Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4,
17-24 (1986); Sunstein, supra note 166.
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the New Deal attack on the common law. 172 A profitable strategy
would be to avoid abstraction and to examine particular areas with con-
siderable care.1 73
Such an approach would force courts to confront the question of
why and how the artifactual quality of a particular system is relevant to
the legal question. The fact that a practice is artifactual hardly means
that it should be changed; and the fact that it is in some sense natural is
not necessarily a reason to respect it.' 74 Consider here the area of gen-
der discrimination; it is the legal system that makes relevant any biolog-
ical difference, and a decision to turn a difference into a disadvantage
demands independent support. 7-5 But a finding that a practice or sys-
tem is a product of government is relevant in various respects. First, it
may suggest that changes should not be regarded as "takings"; the no-
tion of a taking depends on an antecedent baseline, and if the baseline
is not natural, one needs an independent reason to respect it. More-
over, if a practice is revealed as simply an adaptation to the status quo,
new legal rules will not be futile. Finally, it is sometimes thought that
interferences with practices that are an outgrowth of nature infringe on
liberty or on some other right. The Lochner era is itself an example, and
the areas of race and gender discrimination might be similarly under-
stood. A recognition that the practices in question are artifactual may
weaken such objections. The fact that a practice is a creature of gov-
ernment thus removes some arguments for retaining it, though stand-
ing by itself, it is hardly a powerful reason to change it.
Development of a theory of justice that interprets the constitu-
tional text but that is independent of the status quo is extremely diffi-
cult. A strong version of anti-Lochner thinking would make it hard to
provide foundations from which to begin the inquiry; even theories of
distributive justice need to accept some grounds from which to pro-
ceed. 176 Such theories must be culturally situated. The notion of a
foundational theory existing entirely apart from conventions is likely to
be chimerical, and in its own way reflective of Lochner-like premises. If
172. Republican approaches tend not to see rights as prepolitical; the Lochner un-
derstanding of the common law can thus be criticized on republican grounds, and those
grounds tend to replicate the ideas described supra notes 7-8, 39-45 and accompanying
text.
173. V. Held, Rights and Goods: Justifying Social Action (1984); Minow, Where
Difference has Its Home, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev 111 (1987). But see the criticisms of
Held in Fishkin, Book Review, 97 Ethics 473-74 (1987) (arguing in favor of impartiality
and abstraction). This sort of approach fits comfortably with the emerging enthusiasm
for various forms of contextualized practical reason in various fields. See R. Bernstein,
Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (1983); M. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness:
Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (1986); Michelman, supra note 171.
174. See L. Tribe, supra note 136; C. MacKinnon, supra note 134.
175. See C. MacKinnon, supra note 134; C. MacKinnon, supra note 127.
176. See M. Nussbaum, supra note 173; Lukes, Of Gods and Demons: Habermas
and Practical Reason, in Habermas: Critical Debates U. Thompson & D. Heble eds.
1982).
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so, the task is instead to be critical of existing practices without pre-
tending to have transcended the particular culture altogether. 177
One can point to some such efforts in current law. The first
amendment prohibitions of discrimination on the basis of point of view
and of government preference of particular religions are prominent ex-
amples. 178 The law of racial discrimination is a particularly helpful il-
lustration here. Courts have developed theories that permit them to
evaluate particular social practices from an independent baseline, one
that prohibits intentional discrimination against blacks. Discrimination
on the basis of gender, alienage, and illegitimacy is handled in similar
terms. The principal effort here is to develop and justify an alternative
baseline, and to imagine a world in which the illegitimate or irrelevant
considerations were not at work.
In some areas, this task appears easy, but the setting of school seg-
regation suggests why development of a baseline independent of the
status quo is sometimes difficult. For a long period, the controversial
questions here had to do with the constitutionality of freedom of choice
and other plans in attempting to eliminate the effects of segregation. 179
Freedom-of-choice plans do not significantly reduce segregation, but
court-ordered transportation plans, including racial percentages, can
hardly be said to be restoring the system to what it would be if discrimi-
nation had never taken place. The problem here is to imagine a hypo-
thetical world in which housing patterns and educational choices were
unaffected by past discrimination. The search for a status quo ante in
the area of school segregation has an arbitrary quality, and sometimes
the Court has had to come close to requiring integration in the absence
of any other plausible version of a reconstructed system.' 80
The problem is hardly limited to the area of school segregation. It
arises in many cases in which courts are asked to reject the status quo as
the appropriate baseline. Consider, for example, a decision to allow a
showing of discriminatory effects to trigger the equal protection clause.
To a greater or lesser degree, such a decision would require courts to
imagine what the system of benefits and burdens across the races would
look like in a world unaffected by a legacy of racism. Although inquir-
177. See P. Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia (1986) (discussing critique of
prevailing ideology from within that ideology and from standpoint of "utopia"); M.
Nussbaum, supra note 173 (arguing in favor of Aristotelean approach to ethics); M.
Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (1987) (urging "connected criticism"); see
also R. Bernstein, supra note 173 (exploring various approaches that attempt to criticize
status quo without pretending to evade convention entirely); R. Rorty, Philosophy and
the Mirror of Nature 155-64 (1980) (criticizing foundationalism in philosophy).
178. See supra note 120.
179. See Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has Come: Antidiscriminatory Law
in the Second Decade After Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 742 (1974);
Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale LJ. 585 (1983).
180. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus
Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
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ies of this sort are familiar in some areas of the law, in the present
context they would be difficult to anchor; the causal links are so com-
plex that a reconstruction of the past would inevitably rest on uncertain
premises. 18 ' The area of gender discrimination poses similar
problems. Imagine efforts to see how veterans' preferences or abortion
would be treated in a world unaffected by sexism.18 2
This is not the occasion to set out a general theory of appropriate
baselines from which to decide constitutional cases; as we will see, the
answer is likely to vary across provisions. It should suffice to suggest
that the common law or status quo baseline in Lochner will often be
unacceptable; that the existing order should not be regarded as natural
or inviolate; that the abandonment of baselines altogether is also unac-
ceptable; and that generation of an independent alternative is some-
times necessary but poses large difficulties of its own. Current law is an
amalgam of all three approaches. The primary purpose here is to sug-
gest some of the ingredients in the decision why and when Lochner-like
premises should be abandoned.
An important lesson of the discussion to follow is the need to pro-
ceed with some particularity. Abstract or general approaches are un-
likely to be helpful here, at least for the foreseeable future.'83 The
examination of particular areas is the starting point for extrapolating
more general principles.
B. Swords and Shields
Even if the Holmesian approach is rejected, a less extreme version
would suggest that in deciding whether Lochner-like premises should be
accepted, it is highly relevant whether the Court is permitting govern-
ment to act or prohibiting it from doing so. Courts might, in short, be
inclined to uphold measures defended in terms like those in West Coast
Hotel, even as they were disinclined to invalidate legislation under
premises derived from either Lochner or West Coast Hotel. Deference to
representative processes argues in favor of this result.'8 4 Under this
view, the parallel of modem decisions to Lochner is closest when the
181. Cf. J. Vining, supra note 90 (discussing difficulties of reconstruction of past in
general).
182. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); see Seidman, Public
Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of
Constitutional Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1006 (1987). Cf. C. MacKinnon, supra note 134 (pro-
posing a test of whether legal rules perpetuate subordination of women); and compare
Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 956 (1984) (criticizing that
approach for not being subject to judicial management).
183. See L. Tribe, Constitution as Point of View (unpublished manuscript, January
1981).
184. To some degree this position itself incorporates Lochner-like premises; it dis-
tinguishes judicial action from inaction, and makes the distinction turn on whether the
Court is forcing dramatic changes in the status quo. Here, however, the inquiry de-
pends on institutional concerns having to do with the role of the judiciary.
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Court is invalidating democratically-enacted legislation. Even if one re-
jects the most extreme claims about the undemocratic character ofjudi-
cial review, one might agree that Lochner-like premises should rarely be
used to invalidate legislation.
The argument for upholding the statute in Buckley v. Valeo was
therefore quite strong; the case was very close to Lochner itself-unless
there is some difference in the nature of the right, an issue taken up
below. Similarly, measures calling for "affirmative action," viewed
through the lens of the Lochner era, should generally not be thought to
raise a serious constitutional issue. When a legislature or other entity
enacts an affirmative action program, it should not be treated as operat-
ing against a status quo baseline that is in some sense natural or neu-
tral. The current distribution of benefits and burdens along racial lines
is an outgrowth of a long history of discrimination. Efforts to eliminate
the subordination of blacks can hardly be regarded in the same way as
efforts to perpetuate it.185
Similar considerations apply to redistributive measures enacted
under the constracts and taking clauses. Notwithstanding recent criti-
cism under Lochner-like premises, 186 current law under both clauses is
generally correct. It permits a wide realm of action for legislatures, an
appropriate conclusion in the face of textual ambiguity, the evident
desires of the majority, changed circumstances, and the growing scope
of the police power.' 87 In all of these contexts, an understanding like
that in West Coast Hotel should operate, at least prima facie, as a "shield"
against constitutional attacks on legislation, just as it does under the
due process clause in the aftermath of Lochner.
Because of institutional concerns, more difficult questions are
raised by the prospect of using West Coast Hotel as a "sword," that is, as
the basis for constitutional attacks on existing social structures. In this
category can be put the various arguments for a discriminatory effects
test under the equal protection clause. So too, some of the arguments
in the racial and gender area attempt to use an understanding like that
in West Coast Hotel as a sword against government. In the same category
can be placed the claims for welfare rights. In such cases, the fact that
the plaintiff is attacking legislation enacted by a popular majority
counts against recognition of the claim.' 88
All this is hardly to suggest that the issue of swords and shields
185. See Lempert, The Force of Irony: On the Morality of Affirmative Action and
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 95 Ethics 86 (1984); Strauss, supra note 110.
186. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev.
703 (1984); R. Epstein, supra note 5.
187. See Grey, supra note 27; Sax, Book Review, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 279 (1986)
(reviewing R. Epstein, Takings (1985)).
188. The relevant norms might, however, be regarded as binding on legislators and
administrators even if they are not enforced by the judiciary. See Sager, Fair Measure:
The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212
(1978).
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should control the constitutional question; that would represent a re-
turn to Holmesian understandings about the judicial role and in its own
way reflect Lochner-like distinctions between action and inaction. 18 9 But
the issue is highly relevant. Constitutional law is often an uneasy mix-
ture of substantive theory and institutional constraint.1 90 The exist-
ence of institutional limits on the part of the judiciary forces the courts
to limit the scope of substantive constraints on government action.
This combination sometimes produces doctrinal awkwardness, but it is
hard to think of an alternative. In these circumstances, it is important
whether a decision would call for simple validation of a measure en-
acted by Congress or instead would require courts to undertake signifi-
cant social change on their own.
C. The Nature of the Clause
The catalog of Lochner-like premises in modern public law spans a
wide range, and it implicates a large number of constitutional provi-
sions, including the contracts, takings, due process, and equal protec-
tion clauses as well as the first amendment. But Lochner-like premises
are more necessary or appropriate under some provisions than under
others. A lawyer's natural reaction to the problem would be to disen-
tangle the various provisions. The interpretive process, informed to a
greater or lesser degree by the text and original purposes, might well
vary across clauses; different clauses may abandon or include Lochner-
like premises. A theory of constitutional interpretation would of course
be necessary to accomplish this task.
At the most general level, it is possible to understand the original
Constitution as having a substantial Lochner-like dimension. Both the
institutional and the individual rights provisions of the document were
influenced by an understanding of the naturalness of the distribution of
property.19' The Civil War Amendments were at least a partial recog-
nition of the artifactual quality of existing distributions, and subsequent
judicial interpretation carried that recognition much further. The vari-
ous developments associated with the New Deal 192 were a substantial
abandonment of the Lochner-like features of constitutionalism, in its in-
stitutional and individual rights dimensions. One of the most impor-
tant tasks of modern constitutional theory is to integrate these various
developments into a theory of constitutional interpretation.
Lochner, under a textual approach, was wrong above all because it
was an interpretation of the due process clause. That clause may be
189. See supra note 163.
190. See Sager, supra note 188, at 1212.
191. See The Federalist No. 10, at 83-84 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); J.
Nedelsky, supra note 145.
192. See generally Sunstein, supra note 146; Ackerman, Discovering the Constitu-
tion, 93 Yale LJ. 1013 (1984).
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only procedural in character; 193 it may require the government only to
show some minimal justification for its decisions; it may not sharply
confine the permissible ends of the state. The takings clause, by con-
trast, was built on a belief in the meaning and importance of private
property, and it would be difficult to read that clause in the fashion of
West Coast Hotel without reading it out of the Constitution. The same
conclusion may be appropriate under the contracts clause. At a mini-
mum, then, the takings and contracts clauses cannot easily be read -to
create a constitutional baseline other than that of the status quo; the
notion of property itself develops and evolves from common cultural
understandings that cannot easily be subject to independent judicial re-
construction.' 94 The eminent domain and contracts clauses are most
naturally read to embody Lochner-like premises about neutrality and
inaction.
At the same time, it would be possible to remove both provisions
from their foundations in Lochner. In particular, courts might recognize
the social construction of property and understand the term "takings"
against the backdrop set by independent theories of entitlement and an
appreciation of the social functions of private ownership. Such an ap-
proach would produce difficult questions ofjudicial authority and com-
petence, but some have argued in favor of an effort of that sort.195 If
such an effort is to be made, however, it should proceed slowly and
incrementally in light of the history and current interpretation of the
clause.
By contrast to the takings and contracts clauses, the equal protec-
tion clause is most easily read as a self-conscious rejection of Lochner-
like premises. The purpose of the clause was, at least to some degree,
to break up the system of subordination of blacks; the best interpreta-
tion of the clause recognizes that the existing allocation of power
among the races is both artifactual and illegitimate, and its purpose is,
to a greater or lesser extent, to equalize that allocation. It should not
be surprising that insofar as understandings deriving from West Coast
Hotel have been used as a sword against government, the equal protec-
tion clause has usually been the textual source of decision.
Much of equal protection law grows directly out of West Coast Hotel.
Consider not only the attack on racial discrimination, but anti-
discrimination law involving poverty, illegitimacy, alienage, and per-
haps above all gender. The equal protection clause is most obviously a
193. SeeJ. Ely, supra note 6, at 18.
194. See B. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution (1977) (comparing
views of "ordinary observer" and "scientific policymaker" in interpretation of eminent
domain clause).
195. See, e.g., B. Ackerman, supra note 194; Baker, Property and Its Relation to
Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741 (1986); Michelman, Property
as a Constitutional Right, 38 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1097 (1981).
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rejection of Lochner's premises, just as the takings and contracts clauses
are most obviously their constitutional embodiment.
What of the first amendment? In Buckley itself, the Court sug-
gested that the provision disposed of the issue: the constitutional guar-
antee of freedom of speech prohibits the silencing of some in order to
promote the speech of others. But it is much too facile to point to the
text of the clause. Whether regulation of powerful private speakers
might sometimes promote "freedom of speech" is the question to be
decided. There was a powerful argument in Buckley that campaign fi-
nance regulation was necessary in order to promote freedom of speech;
one could argue that such regulation was closer to being compelled
than proscribed.' 96 On the other hand, a wholesale abandonment of
Lochner-like premises, requiring courts to look at the content of speech,
would wreak havoc with existing first amendment doctrine-as it did
earlier in the century with private property under the due process
clause.
Indeed, the central commitment of the first amendment, as cur-
rently interpreted, is to neutrality on the basis of content or view-
point,197 and this commitment has a Lochner-like feature. Issues of
substantive power and powerlessness do not enter into the constitu-
tional inquiry. Government must be neutral between those viewpoints
that are good and bad, or those speakers that have power and those
that have none.1 98 A set of doctrines growing out of West Coast Hotel
would repudiate Buckley; efforts to redress the distorting effects of fi-
nancial contributions can be fit within the police power, especially in
light of theories of free speech that grow out of republican conceptions
of politics. 199 But doctrines based on West Coast Hotel might also be led
to reject the commitment to viewpoint neutrality.200 Under such an ap-
proach, redistributive and paternalistic goals would be permissible
under the first amendment.201 The police power under the first
amendment would thus be close to the police power under the four-
teenth. Such an approach would permit government to impose a wide
range of regulatory restrictions, mostly on the speech of the powerful,
in the interest of reassessment of the existing distribution of power.
There are reasons to be skeptical of so general an approach. The
problem of deciding who is powerful and who is not is too manipulable
and too likely to be skewed by impermissible factors to be the basis for
196. See Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1485 (1986).
197. See Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 189 (1983).
198. See MacKinnon, supra note 51.
199. See A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948).
200. See Fiss, supra note 196.
201. See Fiss, supra note 196; Fiss, Why the State?, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 790-94
(1987). Cf. R. Wolff, B. Moore & H. Marcuse, A Critique of Pure Tolerance (1968)
(criticizing traditional beliefs in free expression and tolerance).
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first amendment doctrine. Moreover, there are good reasons to com-
plain about restrictions on the speech of the powerful. Buckley itself was
wrongly decided; the principle at issue there might be confined to fi-
nancial expenditures without endangering the general principle of
viewpoint neutrality.20 2 But it should not be surprising to find Lochner-
like premises in first amendment doctrine.
All this suggests that some constitutional provisions incorporate
Lochner-like premises, others reject them, and still others create difficult
interpretive problems. The nature of the provisions will thus be a sig-
nificant factor in deciding about appropriate baselines.
D. The Nature of the Causal Links
Another factor has to do with the reality or perception of a close
causal link between identifiable government action and the practice
under attack. In the context of welfare, the link between government
action and poverty may seem too attenuated to justify a claim of causa-
tion; numerous other causal factors play a role. The same conclusion is
drawn in the context of de facto segregation. School and housing pat-
terns are affected by many factors, and the relevant legal rules were not
in force in the immediate past. The case of discriminatory effects may
be similarly understood, for the existence of such effects is the result of
a wide range of factors. Consider by contrast the courts' ready accept-
ance of remedial plans for actual racial discrimination in the recent past
by the defendant. Here the link between state action and racially based
harm is so tight that causation is unquestionable. Judgments about
causation thus play a significant role in the cases.
This concern, however, imports some Lochner-like premises about
action and inaction and is in any event secondary. In the cases under
consideration, there is almost always "but for" causation. The causa-
tion issue produces difficulties when and because it is hard to imagine a
status quo ante. Consider, for example, a claim that de facto segrega-
tion is unconstitutional, or even an attack on de jure segregation thirty
years ago. To imagine what the system would look like if the conduct
under attack had not occurred is necessarily speculative and largely un-
anchored. This point presents the problem of baseline in another
form.
E. The Consequences: Utilitarian and Other Losses
Judgments about caustion are not based solely on a reconstruction
-of history.203 Sometimes the decision is affected by the perceived con-
sequences of finding a causal link. Consider, for example, recognition
of a constitutional right to welfare. It may be conceded here that pov-
202. For general discussion, see Fiss, supra note 196 (arguing against viewpoint
neutrality because of maldistributions of social power).
203. See H. Hart & A. Honor6, Causation in the Law (1984).
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erty is in some sense a creation of the state. But if it were to follow that
welfare was constitutionally guaranteed, the result may be to under-
mine incentives for productive labor. Another example has to do with
discriminatory effects. If such effects were sufficient to produce invalid-
ity, the consequences would be enormous. Affirmative action would be
constitutionally mandated. Such a step would impose a severe strain on
the judiciary. Moreover, it would impose costs of two kinds. The deci-
sion about which discriminatory effects were permissible and why
would be enormously complex. Serious strains would be imposed on
the judiciary, particularly in the remedial process.
The utilitarian and other losses-including enforcement prob-
lems-of abandoning Lochner are thus relevant to the constitutional in-
quiry. They will tend to be largest in cases in which other branches of
government support the practice under attack. When, for example,
Congress has enacted a statute abandoning Lochner-like principles,
these considerations are secondary. In such cases the elected branches
have decided that the utilitarian losses are properly incurred, and
problems of enforcement are minimized. When the elected branches
are on the other side, however, those losses and problems are properly
taken into account. They are a secondary consideration, buttressing
the development of substantive and institutional theories in the wake of
Lochner.
F. Summary
We have seen that the question whether Lochner-like premises
should be abandoned cannot be answered in the abstract. The issue
depends on a mixture of substantive, institutional, and interpretive
considerations. The substantive problems present issues of distributive
justice; the institutional issues present problems of democratic theory;
the interpretive questions raise problems of linguistic theory as well as
substantive and institutional issues.20 4 In generating a set of constitu-
tional doctrines in the aftermath of Lochner, it is necessary to proceed
with considerable caution. No formula is available. But the foregoing
discussion suggests some generalizations and examples that may prove
helpful here. In Lochner itself, the textual pedigree of the decision was
uncertain; and the outcome reached by the Court ran in the face of a
powerful and mounting national consensus in the other direction. Sim-
ilar considerations justify, at least in broad outline, the Court's current
approach to the takings and contracts clauses. These provisions are
necessarily Lochner-like in character; they cannot be read out of the
Constitution, but a generous approach to the police power is appropri-
204. For some, the three problems, in concert, mean that judges must decide cases
by reference to the "intent of the framers," or original meaning, or some other purport-
edly sharp constraint on judicial decisions. That approach is rejected here. See supra
note 167 and accompanying text.
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ate under both provisions. Affirmative action for both race and gender
is relatively easy. The measures in question have been adopted demo-
cratically; the equal protection clause is a repudiation of Lochner-like
principles; utilitarian concerns cannot be said to count powerfully
against affirmative action and may argue in favor of validation; the un-
certainty of causation is a secondary matter. Judicial review of agency
inaction and standing for regulatory beneficiaries are also relatively
easy. Here Congress has created and endorsed a broad presumption of
reviewability, and most important, review would serve only to vindicate
constitutional and statutory provisions as against the executive branch.
Some benefits that are the creature of statute should stand on the same
footing as common law interests for purposes of both procedural and
substantive due process. The rise of hearing rights for beneficiaries of
spending programs is therefore appropriate. 20 5 Buckley v. Valeo was de-
cided incorrectly. In the context of financial expenditures, the first
amendment need hardly be read in the Lochner-like fashion suggested
by the Court.
The most difficult cases here involve discriminatory effects under
the equal protection clause, welfare rights, and some of the state action
cases, including those that raise the possibility of a right to protection
against private racial discrimination. Viewed through the lens of the
Lochner period, these decisions seem incorrect in their reasoning and
questionable in their outcomes. All of them depend on premises about
the appropriate baseline that were properly rejected during the Lochner
period. But as we have seen, there are powerful prudential and institu-
tional considerations that argue in favor of caution. The primary pur-
pose here is not to suggest how such cases should be decided, now or
in the near future, but instead to remove one of the props supporting
current doctrine and to suggest some of the relevant inquiries.
CONCLUSION
The Lochner Court required government neutrality and was skepti-
cal of government "intervention"; it defined both notions in terms of
whether the state had threatened to alter the common law distribution
of entitlements and wealth, which was taken to be a part of nature
rather than a legal construct. Once the common law system came to be
seen as a product of legal rules, the baseline from which constitutional
decisions were made had to shift. When the Lochner framework was
abandoned in West Coast Hotel, the common law system itself appeared
to be a subsidy to employers. The West Coast Hotel Court thus adopted
an alternative baseline and rejected Lochner era understandings of neu-
trality and action.
If the Lochner era is thought to embody less an active judicial role
205. Cf.J. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State (1985) (justifying such
rights on participatory and dignatory grounds).
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and more particular conceptions of baseline, neutrality, and action, it
has not been entirely overruled. Numerous modem decisions reflect
similar understandings. Cases distinguishing between "positive" and
"negative" rights are built on Lochner-like premises that take the com-
mon law as the baseline for decision. Much of the law of racial discrimi-
nation can be understood similarly, though here the baseline is the
status quo rather than the common law. The constitutional attack on
affirmative action, indeed the very term, suggests that the current distri-
bution of benefits and burdens along racial lines is simply "there." The
state action doctrine borrows heavily from common law understandings
about the proper role of government. Some of first amendment doc-
trine, especially that involving campaign financing, is based on similar
premises.
It is one thing to identify Lochner-like premises in current constitu-
tional law; it is quite another to suggest when and how they should be
abandoned. One possible approach would be to reject, in the fashion
ofJustice Holmes, any baseline as a matter of constitutional law. Under
this approach, the distribution of wealth and entitlements would be for
political rather than legal determination. But we have seen that such an
approach is too crude, for it would spell an end to constitutionalism. If
the idea of baselines is to be retained, and if Lochner is at least some-
times to be abandoned, the task for the future is to develop theories of
distributive justice, derived from constitutional text and purposes, that
might serve as the basis for evaluating any particular practice.
Whether and how to develop and implement such theories is a
mixture of substantive and institutional problems. We have seen that
whether Lochner-like premises are used to invalidate or uphold legisla-
tion is relevant. Moreover, some provisions are most plausibly under-
stood in Lochner-like terms, whereas others self-consciously reject those
premises; consider the equal protection clause. Second-order consid-
erations include whether there is a clear causal connection between
identifiable social practices and the harms invoked by the plaintiff. So-
cial consequences, including utilitarian losses, properly play a role in
the decision. Development and implementation of an alternative ap-
proach that would incorporate those inquiries is a large task indeed.
But there is reason to reject several lines of cases that depend on
Lochner-like premises, as in the areas of campaign finance regulation,
judicial review of agency inaction, gender discrimination, and affirma-
tive action. There is reason as well to raise questions about the reason-
ing and perhaps the outcome in more difficult areas, involving
discriminatory effects and "positive" rights.
However these questions are resolved, the central issue in numer-
ous areas of the law-involving campaign finance regulation, hearing
rights, affirmative action, gender and race discrimination, standing, re-
view of agency inaction, state action, and "positive" rights-is whether
there is a constitutional requirement of neutrality that commands pres-
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ervation of the status quo as reflected in market outcomes, or instead
whether the Constitution, recognizing the artifactual quality of the mar-
ket allocation, permits and sometimes demands change. One might un-
derstand the Lochner era as, above all, a warning about constitutional
doctrine that defines neutrality in terms of the perpetuation of current
practice, and that treats government conduct tending to sustain it as
"inaction" invariably escaping legal sanction, and government conduct
proposing change as "action" tending to raise legal doubts.
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